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This thesis explores the issue law enforcement has been confronting since the 
Edward Snowden leaks prompted technology companies to design their communication 
devices with enhanced encryption. As a result of these modifications, many 
investigations have been stymied because providers claim that they can no longer furnish 
law enforcement with device and communication content, even when so ordered by the 
court. Device designers and communication providers claim that enhanced encryption is 
intended to protect individual privacy and corporate intellectual property. However, these 
changes have resulted in providing criminals and terrorists alike with avenues to 
communicate anonymously and out of law enforcement’s reach. A significant issue is 
that legislation has not kept pace with emerging communication platforms. The Policy 
Analysis method was employed to explore potential solutions to this issue, culminating 
with the conclusion that the problem requires a two-pronged approach to address 
both data in motion, and data at rest. Data in motion refers to communications in real-
time, and it should be addressed by installing spyware to capture the content. Data at 
rest refers to stored content, and it should be addressed by the use of split-key 
encryption. Both methods would require amending current statutes or drafting 
entirely new legislation to cover existing and future communication platforms. 
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An investigative tool often exploited by law enforcement to further investigations 
is analyzing target communications. These communications may be derived from 
telephone devices or various electronic means, and in some cases the investigations may 
be extremely time-sensitive, such as kidnapping or terrorism cases. However, law 
enforcement is currently encountering difficulties with providers or device creators who 
claim that they are unable to comply with court orders in providing the requested 
information.1 The main issue is that the devices are being intentionally engineered to 
safeguard personal privacy and corporate intellectual property.2 Engineers are designing 
evermore enhanced encryption that their own companies assert they cannot bypass.3  
For many years law enforcement has relied on its ability to intercept and exploit 
subject communications in furtherance of investigations. The Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which was passed in 1994, requires 
providers to furnish law enforcement with the means to intercept traditional telephone 
and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications.4 However, many new forms of 
communication continue to emerge that do not fall under the umbrella of CALEA, such 
as Skype peer-to-peer messaging, gaming consoles, social media, and BlackBerry 
                                                 
1 John L. Potapchuk, “A Second Bite at the Apple: Federal Courts’ Authority to Compel Technical 
Assistance to Government Agents in Accessing Encrypted Smartphone Data Under the All Writs Act,” 
Boston College Law Review 57, no. 4 (2016): 1404–1405. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 1405; “Apple Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search 
Warrants,” Washington Post, September 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/tech 
nology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html?utm_term=.0192bb7759ae. 
4 “Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,” Federal Communications Commission, 
February 10, 2011, https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-security/policy-and-licensing-divi 
sion/general/communications-assistance. 
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encrypted email.5 In addition, providers and electronic device designers, such as Apple 
and Google have begun engineering their products with enhanced encryption.6  
Even when served with proper legal process, some companies claim that they 
cannot comply with court orders and provide law enforcement with the requested 
information or assistance, because they are unable to bypass the encryption designed by 
their own engineers.7 Targets of investigation are drawn to communication methods that 
allow them to operate anonymously. Enhanced encryption techniques and the lack of 
adequate legislation to cover these emerging forms of communications hamper law 
enforcement’s ability to conduct investigations.8 
A significant gap exists between what law enforcement believes is reasonable 
access to information it has been able to obtain since CALEA was enacted, albeit in a 
different format, and what privacy experts and technology companies perceive as 
continued government overreach. Following the Edward Snowden leaks, technology 
companies began to enhance encryption to safeguard their intellectual property and 
customer privacy.9 Privacy experts assert that providing access to electronic devices by 
introducing vulnerabilities to assist law enforcement would unduly increase the risk to 
individuals and businesses alike.10 
Government officials have offered suggestions for how CALEA could be 
amended to mitigate the deficiencies, but it is not known if sufficient legislative support 
                                                 
5 Christa M. Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet: The Expansion of the Communications Assistance to 
Law Enforcement Act to Extend Government Surveillance,” Federal Communications Law Journal 64, no. 
2, art 5 (2012): 372–373, http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1617&context 
=fclj,  
6 Potapchuk, “A Second Bite at the Apple,” 1403. 
7 Ibid. 
8 “Encryption and Cyber Security for Mobile Electronic Communication Devices,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, April 29, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/encryption-and-cyber-security-for-
mobile-electronic-communication-devices. 
9 Craig Timberg, “Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking 
Police,” Washington Post, September 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/ 
wp/2014/09/18/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/? 
utm_term=.7afa491b5834. 
10 Harold Abelson et al., Keys under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Government 
Access to All Data and Communications (Cambridge, MA: MIT Computer Science & Artificial 
Intelligence Lab, 2015), 10, https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/AABBx15x.pdf.  
 xvii 
exists to make any of these proposals a reality.11 Privacy experts and technology 
companies argue against amending CALEA, contending that these emerging forms of 
communication should not be treated the same as standard voice intercepts, as individuals 
tend to divulge more private information through these means.12 In addition, many types 
of decryption techniques are currently available that could allow law enforcement to 
continue accessing the information it requires; however, privacy experts and technology 
companies fiercely oppose these methods.13 The question this thesis attempts to address 
is, How can law enforcement access encrypted and emerging electronic communications 
to further investigations without compromising individual privacy and intellectual 
property?  
The research and analysis for this thesis has culminated in five conclusions. The 
first conclusion is that newly drafted legislation or legislation amending CALEA is 
necessary to solve the “Going Dark” issue. The second conclusion is that due to the 
limitations of existing legislation, the private sector has acted in a manner that constrains 
law enforcement’s authority to conduct legal searches, even when armed with proper 
legal process.14 The third conclusion is that prosecutors may inadvertently be doing the 
agencies they represent and law enforcement in general a disservice by delaying or 
underreporting wiretap statistics reported to the court. The reported statistics are passed 
on to Congress, who evaluates them for various purposes, to include assessing the 
seriousness of the encryption issue.15 When roughly one-third of the statistics are not 
reported in a timely manner, or at all, this may prove detrimental to garnering support to 
                                                 
11 Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet,” 376. 
12 Ibid., 387. 
13 Kevin Schaul, “Encryption Techniques and the Access They Give,” Washington Post, April 10, 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/encryption-techniques-and-access-they-give/ 
1665/. 
14 “Fourth Amendment,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, February 5, 
2010, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment; The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing 
Americans’ Security and Privacy—Hearing: Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 114th 
Cong. 2 (2016), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/114-78_98899.pdf. 
15 “FAQs: Wiretap Reports,” United States Courts, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/wiretap-reports/faqs-wiretap-reports. 
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address the encryption problem.16 The fourth conclusion is that despite protestations by 
privacy and security experts, it is possible to provide law enforcement with the access to 
communications it requires, while minimizing the risk to individual privacy and corporate 
intellectual property. Apple deployed its enhanced encryption following the Edward 
Snowden leaks.17 However, the company admits that to its knowledge, its previous 
encryption and code had not been undermined.18 This level of encryption provided 
adequate privacy protections, yet remained accessible to law enforcement with Apple’s 
assistance.19  
The final conclusion is that out of the six decryption/access techniques analyzed, 
the two that show the most promise are split-key encryption and the insertion of spyware 
also known as a State Trojan.20 Employment of either option would require new or 
amended legislation. Both decryption/access options have advantages and disadvantages. 
Access to communications and device content is a complex issue. Perhaps the reason it 
has been so difficult to overcome is that it has traditionally been approached as a single 
issue, when in reality it requires a two-pronged approach. When law enforcement has the 
device in its custody, subsequent to an arrest, search warrant or court order, the focus will 
likely be on retrieving data at rest. Data at rest refers to all content stored on the device, 
not ongoing communications in real time.21 In these instances, split-key encryption 
seems to be the best option for fulfilling law enforcement’s needs while still providing a 
level of security for individual privacy and corporate intellectual property. As this option 
                                                 
16 “Wiretap Reports,” United States Courts, accessed May 10, 2017, http://www.uscourts.gov/stat 
istics-reports/analysis-reports/wiretap-reports. 
17 Susan Hennessey and Benjamin Wittes, “Apple Is Selling You a Phone, Not Civil Liberties,” 
Lawfare (blog), February 18, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/apple-selling-you-phone-not-civil-
liberties; Timberg, “Newest Androids.” 
18 H.R., Encryption Tightrope, 190. 
19 District Attorney, New York County, Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on 
Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety: An Update to the November 2015 Report (Manhattan, NY: 
District Attorney, New York County, 2016), 13, http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/Report%20on 
%20Smartphone%20Encryption%20and%20Public%20Safety:%20An%20Update.pdf.  
20 Schaul, “Encryption Techniques”; “Growing Opposition in Germany to New Surveillance 
Measures,” Homeland Security Newswire, June 26, 2017, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/ 
dr20170626-growing-opposition-in-germany-to-new-surveillance-measures. 
21 Nate Lord, “Data Protection: Data in Transit vs. Data at Rest,” Digital Guardian (blog), June 13, 
2016, https://digitalguardian.com/blog/data-protection-data-in-transit-vs-data-at-rest. 
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relies on the private sector’s assistance, it would likely preserve the integrity of the data, 
withstand judicial scrutiny and keep governmental costs down. 
Conversely, surreptitious monitoring of data in motion, communications 
occurring in real time, is a valuable tool used by law enforcement engaged in ongoing, 
long-term investigations. In these instances, the device remains in the hands of the 
subject, who is unaware of the electronic surveillance.22 The installation of a State 
Trojan/spyware may be the most efficient method for law enforcement to monitor 
communications without having to rely on the private sector for assistance. Although 
spyware insertion is to date an untested method or at least not widely reported via open 
sources, it seems to have many advantages. The appropriate response to emerging 
communication platforms and enhanced encryption by law enforcement and legislators 
should include innovative techniques, and the insertion of spyware onto a target’s device 
is certainly revolutionary. Therefore, drafting legislation that addresses how law 
enforcement can obtain both data at rest and data in motion, using the techniques 
described above, may provide the solutions necessary for these issues.  
                                                 
22 Lord, “Data Protection.” 
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An investigative tool often exploited by law enforcement to further investigations 
is analyzing target communications. These communications may be derived from 
telephone devices or various electronic means, and in some cases the investigations may 
be extremely time-sensitive, such as kidnapping or terrorism cases. However, law 
enforcement is currently encountering difficulties with providers or device creators who 
claim that they are unable to comply with court orders in providing the requested 
information.1 The main issue is that the devices are being intentionally engineered to 
safeguard personal privacy and corporate intellectual property.2 Engineers are designing 
evermore enhanced encryption that their own companies assert they cannot bypass.3  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
For many years law enforcement has relied on its ability to intercept and exploit 
subject communications in furtherance of investigations. The Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which was passed in 1994, requires 
providers to furnish law enforcement with the means to intercept traditional telephone 
and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications.4 However, many new forms of 
communication continue to emerge that do not fall under the umbrella of CALEA, such 
as Skype peer-to-peer messaging, gaming consoles, social media, and BlackBerry 
                                                 
1 John L. Potapchuk, “A Second Bite at the Apple: Federal Courts’ Authority to Compel Technical 
Assistance to Government Agents in Accessing Encrypted Smartphone Data Under the All Writs Act,” 
Boston College Law Review 57, no. 4 (2016): 1404–1405. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 1405; “Apple Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search 
Warrants,” Washington Post, September 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/ 
2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html?utm_term=.0192bb7759ae. 
4 “Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,” Federal Communications Commission, 
February 10, 2011, https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-security/policy-and-licensing-
division/general/communications-assistance. 
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encrypted email.5 In addition, providers and electronic device designers, such as Apple 
and Google have begun engineering their products with enhanced encryption.6  
Even when served with proper legal process, some companies claim that they 
cannot comply with court orders and provide law enforcement with the requested 
information or assistance, because they are unable to bypass the encryption designed by 
their own engineers.7 Targets of investigation are drawn to communication methods that 
allow them to operate anonymously. Enhanced encryption techniques and the lack of 
adequate legislation to cover these emerging forms of communications hamper law 
enforcement’s ability to conduct investigations.8 
A significant gap exists between what law enforcement believes is reasonable 
access to information it has been able to obtain since CALEA was enacted, albeit in a 
different format, and what privacy experts and technology companies perceive as 
continued government overreach. Following the Edward Snowden leaks, technology 
companies began to enhance encryption to safeguard their intellectual property and 
customer privacy.9 Privacy experts assert that providing access to electronic devices by 
introducing vulnerabilities to assist law enforcement would unduly increase the risk to 
individuals and businesses alike.10 
Government officials have offered suggestions for how CALEA could be 
amended to mitigate the deficiencies, but it is not known if sufficient legislative support 
                                                 
5 Christa M. Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet: The Expansion of the Communications Assistance to 
Law Enforcement Act to Extend Government Surveillance,” Federal Communications Law Journal 64, no. 
2, art. 2 (2012): 372–373, http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1617&conte 
xt=fclj. 
6 Potapchuk, “A Second Bite at the Apple,” 1403. 
7 Ibid. 
8 “Encryption and Cyber Security for Mobile Electronic Communication Devices,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, April 29, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/encryption-and-cyber-security-for-mob 
ile-electronic-communication-devices. 
9 Craig Timberg, “Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking 
Police,” Washington Post, September 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/20 
14/09/18/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/?utm_term=.7 
afa491b5834. 
10 Harold Abelson et al., Keys under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Government 
Access to All Data and Communications (Cambridge, MA: MIT Computer Science & Artificial 
Intelligence Lab, 2015), 10, https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/AABBx15x.pdf. 
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exists to make any of these proposals a reality.11 Privacy experts and technology 
companies argue against amending CALEA, contending that these emerging forms of 
communication should not be treated the same as standard voice intercepts as individuals 
tend to divulge more private information through these means.12 In addition, many types 
of decryption techniques are currently available that could allow law enforcement to 
continue accessing the information it requires; however, privacy experts and technology 
companies fiercely oppose these methods.13 Technology companies assert that their 
international sales will suffer if they are forced to weaken their encryption to 
accommodate law enforcement, and innovation may be stunted.14 The State Department 
and the Commerce Department have warned that foreign governments hostile to their 
own citizens may exploit known vulnerabilities to persecute dissidents.15  
Technology companies have a part to play in protecting national security, and a 
safe homeland is beneficial as it provides a stable environment for businesses to continue 
to prosper.16 Conversely, law enforcement must recognize that actions by other 
government entities and their representatives have driven a wedge between it and the 
private sector, and that introducing vulnerabilities into devices presents risks to citizens 
and businesses alike.17 This thesis examines the decryption techniques currently 
available, as well as proposed legislation, a combination of which may provide a 
resolution to this problem.  
                                                 
11 Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet,” 376. 
12 Ibid., 387. 
13 Kevin Schaul, “Encryption Techniques and the Access They Give,” Washington Post, April 10, 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/encryption-techniques-and-access-they-
give/1665/. 
14 Kevin Bankston, “It’s Time to End the ‘Debate’ on Encryption Backdoors,” Just Security, July 7, 
2015, https://www.justsecurity.org/24483/end-debate-encryption-backdoors/; Hibbard, “Wiretapping the 
Internet,” 390. 
15 Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet,” 391. 
16 Amitai Etzioni, “Apple: Good Business, Poor Citizen?” Journal of Business Ethics, May 31, 2016, 
8–9. 
17 Timberg, “Newest Androids.” 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can law enforcement access encrypted and emerging electronic 
communications to further investigations without compromising individual privacy and 
intellectual property? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an assessment of the most current literature, 
authored by recognized experts in their respective fields, related to the ongoing debate 
that places individual privacy rights at odds with national security. The reviewed 
literature is derived from a variety of sources and includes writings from privacy experts, 
jurists whose leanings do and do not favor national security interests, academia, federal 
government websites and professional journals. 
This literature review is divided into four sections, followed by a conclusion of 
the sections, and details opportunities to fill existing research gaps. The first section 
focuses on privacy, what it means and why it is important. The second section 
concentrates on security and what individuals may be willing to sacrifice to protect it. 
The third section discusses civil liberties and the position each side in the debate favors, 
and the fourth section covers law as it relates to both privacy and security. 
1. Privacy 
Issues of privacy raise concerns on both sides of the spectrum. In one camp, 
activists scoff at the idea that privacy should be evenly weighed against security, 
believing that the scales tend to unjustly tip in favor of security interests.18 Supporters 
maintain that privacy’s worth decreases as a security threat increases and vice-versa.19 
Daniel J. Solove, a law professor and privacy expert, contends that when it comes to 
security interests, “What should get weighed is the extent of marginal limitation on the 
effectiveness of a government information gathering or data mining program by imposing 
                                                 
18 Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,” George 
Washington University Law School, 761, 763, 772, 2007, http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1159&context=faculty_publications. 
19 Ibid., 763. 
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judicial oversight and minimization procedures.”20 Solove continues, “Only in cases 
where such procedures will completely impair the government program should the 
security interest be weighed in total, rather than in the marginal difference between an 
unencumbered program versus a limited one.”21  
Others argue that governmental needs trump an individual’s right to protect 
personal information.22 The different camps also disagree about the value of and need for 
privacy. Jurist Richard Posner asserts that, “[W]hen people today decry lack of privacy, 
what they want, I think, is mainly something quite different from seclusion: they want 
more power to conceal information about themselves that others might use to their 
disadvantage.”23 Posner continues, “Much of the demand for privacy, however, concerns 
discreditable information, often information concerning past or present criminal activity 
or moral conduct at variance with a person’s professed moral standards.”24 Privacy 
activist Bruce Schneier laments that people often believe the false assumption that those 
who wish to guard their privacy are merely trying to conceal unscrupulous behavior.25 
Schneier maintains that, “Privacy is an inherent human right, and a requirement for 
maintaining the human condition with dignity and respect.”26 Solove asserts that privacy, 
although tricky to define, is not relegated to those with criminal intent.27  
Solove also argues that individual privacy rights benefit society and diminishing 
these rights has a harmful effect.28 He further opines that information collection harms 
                                                 
20 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 761. 
21 Ibid., 761–762. 
22 Richard Mullender, “Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of Emergency,” Journal of Law 
and Society 35, no. 3 (2008): 423. 
23 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 751. 
24 Richard A. Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” University of Chicago Law School, Chicago Unbound, 
399, 1977, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2803&context=journal_arti 
cles. 
25 Bruce Schneier, “Essays: The Eternal Value of Privacy,” Schneier on Security, May 18, 2006, 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2006/05/the_eternal_value_of.html. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 754–756, 764. 
28 Ibid., 763. 
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society by causing individuals to self-censor to avoid detection.29 This leads to inhibited 
individual behavior, expression and freedom.30 Law professor Ann Bartow poses the 
question, “Why is the possibility that a person will be linked to her own volitional words 
and actions a harm that law should pay attention to?”31 Bartow continues, “Are not the 
behaviors that get chilled by a fear of accountability likely to be socially undesirable 
ones?”32 Some contend that these harmful effects have not been adequately articulated, 
which is why tougher legislation has not been enacted to further protect individual 
privacy.33 Solove’s response to this argument is that, “At the end of the day, privacy is 
not a horror movie, and demanding more palpable harms will be difficult in many 
cases.”34 He further states, “Yet there is still a harm worth addressing, even if it is not 
sensationalistic.”35 
It has also been argued that the government’s collection of large data sets and use 
of computers to examine this information does not violate individual privacy.36 The 
stated reasoning is that inanimate objects, such as computers, cannot violate privacy and 
their use may even protect some individuals’ data from ever being reviewed by a 
human.37 Solove refutes this claim by asserting that these, “Are problems of information 
processing, the storage, use, or analysis of data, rather than information collection.”38 
Solove contends, “They affect the power relationships between people and the 
institutions of the modern state.”39 Continuing in this same vein Solove maintains that, 
“They not only frustrate the individual by creating a sense of helplessness and 
                                                 
29 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 758. 
30 Ibid., 758, 765. 
31 Ann Bartow, “A Feeling of Unease about Privacy Law,” 57, University of New Hampshire—School 
of Law, January 1, 2006, http://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=law_facpub. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 52. 
34 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 769. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 752. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 757. 
39 Ibid. 
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powerlessness, but they also affect social structure by altering the kind of relationships 
people have with the institutions that make important decisions about their lives.”40 An 
issue also arises if individuals lack the recourse to correct invalid information collected 
by the government.41 Further, concrete term limits for data storage do not exist in many 
situations.42 If the data is not properly handled, it could be subjected to “secondary use” 
where it is used for an entirely different purpose than what it was initially collected.43  
Former Assistant to the Solicitor General Melissa Arbus claims that, “In the wake 
of September 11, 2001, individuals appear more willing to sacrifice their privacy 
expectations in order to protect the nation from future terrorist attacks.”44 Examples exist 
where the general public has accepted that “common good” outweighs privacy: “sobriety 
checkpoints,” “random drug tests of train engineers,” “airport passenger screening,” and 
mandatory “smallpox vaccinations.”45 As national security threats persist and technology 
advancements continue to emerge, it is unlikely that existing privacy protections will 
remain unchanged.46 
2. Security 
Philosophy instructor Irfan Khawaja asserts that, “Security is the feature of liberty 
in virtue of which each person’s boundaries are safeguarded from external boundary-
crossings, be it by criminals, terrorists, wayward police officers, or bureaucrats.”47 
Khawaja conjures the words of Alexander Hamilton on the subjects of security and 
liberty and interprets them thusly: The belief that Americans must sacrifice liberty for 
                                                 
40 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 757. 
41 Ibid., 766. 
42 Ibid., 767. 
43 Ibid., 767, 770. 
44 Melissa Arbus, “A Legal U-Turn: The Rehnquist Court Changes Direction and Steers Back to the 
Privacy Norms of the Warren Era,” Virginia Law Review 89, no. 7 (November 2003): 1733–1734. 
45 Etzioni, “Apple: Good Business?” 3. 
46 Arbus, “A Legal U-Turn,” 1734.  
47 Irfan Khawaja, “Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,” Dissent 
Magazine, 102, 2006, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/wp-content/files_mf/1389818084d8Khawaja.pdf. 
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security is fallacious, because protecting liberty protects security by default.48 However, 
as Solove points out, weighing security concerns against privacy rights generally favors 
the former, as thwarting additional terrorist attacks remains a priority.49 Combatting 
radical extremism requires that law enforcement collect and analyze massive amounts of 
personal data.50 Jurist Richard Posner’s view is closely aligned with a famous quote 
attributed to David Hume, an 18th-century philosopher.51 Hume was quoted as saying, 
“The safety of the people is the supreme law: All other more special laws are subordinate 
to it, and dependent on it.”52 Posner contends that in the name of national security, U.S. 
lawmakers should give the NSA “carte blanche.”53 The prevailing wisdom is that law-
abiding citizens have nothing to hide and therefore should not fear or question the 
government’s need to access their data.54 Supporters question why it matters if the 
government examines their personal information.55 If they have not committed a crime 
then law enforcement will proceed to the next person’s information, having not harmed 
them in the process.56 In this same vein, the collection of meta-data appears to have a 
low–level impact on individual privacy, compared to the high impact on national security 
if a terrorist attack is stopped.57  
The response to this argument lies in what is known as the “Mosaic Theory.”58 
Although the collection of meta-data may appear relatively harmless, this data can be 
                                                 
48 Khawaja, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 103. 
49 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 753.  
50 Mullender, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 423.  
51 Ibid., 422.  
52 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Salt Lake City, UT: Project 
Gutenberg, 2010; 1912 reprint of the edition of 1777), Section III of Justice, Part II, https://www.gutenberg. 
org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm. 
53 Grant Gross, “Judge: Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data,” PCWorld, December 4, 2014, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-to-digital-data.html. 
54 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 747.  
55 Ibid., 753. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Gabriel R. Schlabach, “Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and the Stored Communications 
Act,” Stanford Law Review 67, no. 3 (March 2015): 677. 
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aggregated and used to forecast potential acts.59 Attorney Gabriel Schlabach asserts that, 
“Under this theory, certain types of long-term (or otherwise expansive) surveillance 
violate a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy, even when each individual act of 
surveillance would otherwise pass Fourth Amendment muster, because the government 
can analyze the information in the aggregate to infer private details about the suspect that 
no individual member of the public could reasonably discover by observing her for a 
short time.”60 Emerging technologies may also provide other ways in which aggregated 
data could be exploited.61  
Posner also argues that the United States is in a continued state of emergency due 
to terrorist threats.62 As a result, he contends that for as long as the country is under 
threat, the President should be empowered to temporarily discontinue or at least curtail 
constitutional rights.63 Those opposed to Posner’s stance take issue with his nebulous use 
of the term emergency.64 His detractors claim that with Posner’s limited definition, the 
United States could be in a state of emergency for decades, and its citizens subjected to 
limited rights for the duration.65 Khawaja likens Posner’s views to that of a dictator.66 
Khawaja takes exception with these opinions and declares, “If the safety of the people is 
the supreme law, it is hard to see how that safety can be preserved in a regime of the sort 
that Posner envisions, where in fact nothing is ever safe.”67 West Point instructor Aaron 
Brantly contends that, “Terrorism remains a problem and a challenge to liberal 
democracy, but undermining the digital security of society without improving the 
                                                 
59 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 766.  
60 Schlabach, “Privacy in the Cloud,” 677.  
61 Ibid., 679. 
62 Mullender, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 422.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Khawaja, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 97–98.  
65 Ibid., 98. 
66 Ibid., 96. 
67 Ibid., 106. 
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capability of security services in a sustained way to detect terrorist activity is a worse 
than futile exercise.”68 
3. Civil Liberties 
Limiting civil liberties in response to specific threats is seen by some as 
prudent.69 As a cost is attached to these limitations, a cost benefit analysis should be used 
to determine the extent to which civil liberties are constrained.70 However, the costs are 
frequently overstated by civil libertarians.71 Posner argues that civil libertarians are, 
“Reluctant to acknowledge that national emergencies in general, and the threat of modern 
terrorism in particular, justify any curtailment of the civil liberties that were accepted on 
the eve of the emergency.”72 Some argue against the stance that the defense of liberty 
requires that individuals accept a certain degree of infringement upon their individual 
liberties.73 Law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky offers the following opinion, “[I]t is so 
important for the debate to get past the point where one side is saying, ‘We’ve got to give 
up civil liberties,’ and the other side is saying, ‘We cannot give up civil liberties’ ... It has 
to be a much more nuanced discussion of what civil liberties are being compromised, 
under which circumstances, and for what gain.”74 
4. Security versus Liberty: Case Law 
Although an impressive work, the Constitution was written by those who could 
not fathom the modern world.75 Khawaja asserts that this document lacks the clarity and 
specificity necessary to provide guidance on individual liberties.76 National security has 
                                                 
68 Aaron Brantly, “Banning Encryption to Stop Terrorists: A Worse than Futile Exercise,” CTC 
Sentinel, August 2017. 
69 Khawaja, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 95. 
70 Ibid., 95–96. 
71 Ibid., 101. 
72 Mullender, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 423. 
73 Khawaja, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 102.  
74 Arbus, “A Legal U-Turn,” 1734. 
75 Khawaja, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 95.  
76 Ibid. 
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been sacrificed in the name of liberty by judges who have been unduly influenced by 
civil libertarians.77 However, examples to the contrary exist. In two separate cases, Bond 
(2000) and Kyllo (2001), the Supreme Court ruled in favor of individual privacy as it 
related to indoor and outdoor surveillance using “both low-tech and high-tech 
surveillance.”78 On the heels of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, airlines provided passenger 
information to law enforcement.79 Some passengers sued the airlines for breach of 
contract, but the court ruled against the plaintiffs.80 
The adequacy of the Third Party Doctrine has also been called into question.81 
Justice Sotomayor opined, “[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed 
to third parties.”82 Currently, individuals are not safeguarded by the Constitution against 
information collected from them by online companies.83 As this information is 
considered to be willingly provided, companies can legally share it with law 
enforcement.84 
Schlabach notes that, “Fast-paced technological change has destabilized the 
current statutory and constitutional framework for protecting citizens’ privacy.”85 He 
continues, “Simultaneously, it poses a challenge to courts wishing to craft appropriate, 
narrowly tailored solutions.”86 
This literature review highlights the great divide between privacy experts and 
government entities, with both sides seemingly unwilling to yield ground. This stalemate 
has stymied progress and made resolving this issue extremely challenging. The core 
                                                 
77 Khawaja, “Not a Suicide Pact,” 96. 
78 Arbus, “A Legal U-Turn,” 1766.  
79 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 769.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Schlabach, “Privacy in the Cloud,” 684–685.  
82 Ibid., 684. 
83 Ibid., 684–685. 
84 Ibid., 691. 
85 Ibid., 697. 
86 Ibid. 
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concern raised by privacy experts and civil libertarians is that defense of national security 
is not a valid reason to sacrifice individual privacy, and that government entities cannot 
be trusted with unlimited power to properly collect, use, manage and dispose of 
personally identifiable information. Conversely, the government’s position is that it is 
charged with protecting individual citizens and safeguarding national security. Therefore, 
limiting the tools available to government to complete these tasks makes protecting the 
country and its citizens, including individual privacy rights exceedingly difficult. This 
thesis explores these issues in further detail, specifically as they relate to enhanced 
encryption and the impact it has on law enforcement investigations.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Technological advances provide evermore opportunities for law enforcement and 
bad actors to exploit personal data at the peril of individual privacy rights. Conversely, 
the United States has endured terrorist attacks, of differing sophistication and damage, in 
recent years. The December 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino highlights the various 
aspects of this issue from the perspective of law enforcement, privacy experts and 
businesses. This thesis analyzes this incident in an attempt to determine if it is possible to 
secure the nation without sacrificing individual privacy rights, and what laws should be 
revised or newly enacted to fill existing gaps. In addition, the majority of the research 
that has been conducted to date focuses on the federal government’s mass accumulation 
of data, most notably by the NSA. The review of the San Bernardino case illustrates the 
difficulties that law enforcement is facing in obtaining information for investigative 
purposes due to enhanced encryption when armed with proper legal process.  
1. Object of Study 
This thesis focuses on the deficiencies of existing legislation that are proving to 
be problematic for law enforcement in accessing electronic communications due to 
enhanced encryption techniques. Current policy does not address how the private sector 
is expected to respond to proper legal process regarding these emerging communication 
platforms or if accommodations can be made to counter enhanced encryption without 
sacrificing personal privacy and corporate intellectual property.  
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2. Selection Criteria and Rationale 
Research will be conducted on the various types of decryption methods currently 
available, and the benefits and limitations of each from the perspectives of the various 
stakeholders, as well as applicable existing legislation. Some of the varying decryption 
techniques that will be researched include engineering access into a device during the 
design phase, creating keys that allow access by the designated holder(s), and using 
system updates to install spyware or a law enforcement friendly operating system. 
Determining the benefits of each decryption technique depends on the perspective of the 
stakeholders. Law enforcement may favor the method that guarantees access, such as 
engineering a point of entry during the design phase. The private sector may prefer a 
system in which service providers maintain sole control of decryption keys, protecting 
both their customers and their intellectual property.  
3. Instrumentation 
The research in this thesis will be comprised of information derived from a review 
of the literature specifically related to law enforcement’s difficulty in accessing 
communications, encryption/decryption techniques, personal privacy, intellectual 
property concerns, corporate revenue concerns, and a review of the San Bernardino 
terrorist investigation. 
4. Steps of Analysis 
The framework employed for this thesis is the policy analysis method. “This will 
include clearly defining the problem, researching and testing potential solutions for 
viability, and putting forth the best recommendation to modify policy and resolve the 
issue.”87 In addition, to provide context, a review of the investigation regarding the San 
Bernardino terrorist’s iPhone and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) attempt to 
enlist Apple’s assistance in accessing the device will also be employed. 
                                                 
87 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path 
to More Effective Problem Solving (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press an Imprint of SAGE Publications, Inc., 
2016), loc. 192–198 of 3,994, Kindle. 
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5. Intended Output 
The goal of this thesis is to find a solution to an existing problem and make a 
recommendation on how to address the issue. The intent is that the final recommendation 
will be used by policy makers to fill legislative gaps and delineate a solution that can be 
applied to all existing and emerging forms of electronic communications so that law 
enforcement investigations will not be hampered by enhanced encryption. Chapter II will 
focus on existing and proposed legislation at the state, federal and international levels. 
Chapter III will define the “Going Dark” issue and contrast it against what some refer to 
as the “Golden Age of Surveillance.”88 Enhanced encryption and decryption access 
techniques will be the subject of Chapter IV. Finally, this thesis will close with a 
conclusion and recommendations for how policy makers may solve this difficult and 
controversial issue. 
  
                                                 
88 Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, Don’t Panic Making Progress on the 
Going Dark Debate (Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 
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II. CURRENT AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
This chapter examines existing legislation that provides law enforcement with the 
authority to intercept communications in the furtherance of investigations. This same 
legislation gives direction to communication providers and device designers as to their 
responsibility for providing assistance to government entities when served with proper 
legal process. Also explored is proposed legislation that may bridge gaps that law 
enforcement is currently facing due to emerging platforms and enhanced encryption. The 
concerns of privacy experts and private sector entities, as well as the government’s 
position are also discussed in this chapter. 
A. EXISTING LEGISLATION  
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is the legal 
authority that law enforcement has historically relied upon to conduct communication 
interceptions.89 When Title III was initially passed, the types of communications subject 
to judicially sanctioned interceptions were limited to “wire and aural communications.”90 
Law enforcement’s interception capabilities were expanded with the passage of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).91 The ECPA increased the 
government’s intercept arsenal by adding electronic communications.92 However, as 
technology evolved, law enforcement’s ability to successfully conduct communication 
interceptions was questioned.93 Congress responded in 1994 by ratifying the 
“Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,” more commonly known as 
“CALEA.”94 Through CALEA, telecommunication providers and manufacturers were 
                                                 
89 “Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,” U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, September 9, 2013, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLib 
erty/authorities/statutes/1284. 
90 Ibid. 
91 “Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,” Justice Information Sharing, U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, July 30, 2013, https://it.ojp.gov/Priva 
cyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Federal Communications Commission, “Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.” 
94 Ibid. 
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mandated to engineer or adapt their products to facilitate the continued interception of 
communications by law enforcement.95 The advent of “Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP)” communications provided consumers with the option of using the Internet to 
place calls rather than relying on traditional analog technology.96 As a result, CALEA 
was amended in 2006 to include VoIP communications.97  
1. CALEA Limitations 
Though legal scholars and technology experts disagree over the scope of CALEA, 
Congress has yet to amend this legislation to remove any ambiguity.98 Lacking further 
adjudication, the prevailing wisdom is that CALEA lacks the authority to compel many 
developing communication platforms to provide law enforcement assistance.99 Providers 
like BlackBerry that transmit encrypted email, social networking sites, such as Facebook, 
companies similar to Skype that provide peer-to-peer messaging, and gaming consoles 
that provide channels for verbal communication, as well as chat, may not be equipped to 
comply with Title III Wiretap orders.100 In addition, the language in CALEA prohibits 
the government from mandating how companies design their products.101  
Members of President Obama’s administration in 2010 floated the idea of 
expanding CALEA to fill the gaps created by emerging technologies and enhanced 
encryption.102 Potential amendments to CALEA that have been circulated include: (1) 
requiring companies to decrypt any messages their systems are responsible for 
                                                 
95 Federal Communications Commission, “Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.” 
96 “Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP),” Federal Communications Commission, November 18, 2010, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/voice-over-internet-protocol-voip. 
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98 Kristin Finklea, Encryption and Evolving Technology: Implications for U.S. Law Enforcement 
Investigations, CRS Report No. R44187 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 6–7, 
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99 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Encryption and Cyber Security.” 
100 Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet,” 372–373. 
101 Robert Longtin, “Apple, the FBI, and an Act from 1789: The FBI’s Impermissible Use of the All 
Writs Act,” Columbia Business Law Review, March 28, 2016, https://cblr.columbia.edu/apple-the-fbi-and-
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September 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html?_r=3&hpw&. 
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encrypting, (2) requiring global companies with U.S. customers to comply with court 
orders by establishing U.S. offices, (3) requiring peer-to-peer providers to engineer their 
programs to permit wiretap, and (4) assessing levies for lack of compliance.103 Most 
importantly, any amendments to CALEA would be crafted in such a way as to prevent 
the language from becoming outdated as technology progresses.104  
The Internet does not currently fall under the purview of CALEA, so although it 
is possible to wiretap, many providers do not create interception capabilities until they 
receive proper legal process.105 Wiretaps of the Internet are different than standard 
telephone interceptions.106 Telephone interceptions are typically done at a switch, 
whereas Internet interception would likely have to be done at endpoints since Internet 
communications are delivered in packets, which may be broken up along transit.107 These 
packets are then delivered and restored at the endpoints through the path with the lowest 
traffic flow.108 Designing access points for interceptions creates vulnerabilities.109 
Theoretically, nation-states could exploit these access points and spy on American 
citizens and corporations.110  
Critics also argue that the private sector would have to bear the brunt of costs to 
become compliant and that the proposed changes would hinder technological 
advancements.111 Apple has claimed that forcing the company to write code that it does 
not wish to write and is not in its best interest violates the First Amendment.112 Code is 
considered speech, and Apple believes fulfilling this request would be tantamount to 
                                                 
103 Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet,” 376. 
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“compelled speech.”113 Apple also claimed that being required to write code is a Fifth 
Amendment violation, equivalent to “forced labor or conscription.”114 During a March 
2016 hearing, Georgia Representative Trey Gowdy made the point that when legally 
compelled, medical professionals are required to remove bullets from unwilling potential 
defendants for evidentiary purposes, and individuals are forced to submit to blood 
withdrawals when suspected of driving under the influence.115 Gowdy continued, “So if 
you can penetrate the integrity of the human body in certain categories of cases, how in 
the hell you can’t access a phone, I just find baffling.”116  
The government argues that it is not seeking additional powers; it is merely trying 
to keep pace with criminals who are changing their methods of communication.117 The 
government also asserts that engineering interception capabilities would create less 
vulnerability than modifying the design after the fact.118 As for the claim that amending 
CALEA would impede innovation, the telephone companies made the same assertion in 
regards to cellular telephones when the law was first enacted, but the market became 
extremely profitable.119  
2. All Writs Act 
In the case of the San Bernardino terrorists, the FBI served Apple with legal 
process via the All Writs Act (AWA) to gain access to an iPhone used by one of the 
shooters.120 This legislation was passed in 1789 and is intended for use when no other 
legislation is appropriate.121 The language of the statute reads: 
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(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may 
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.122 
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a 
court which has jurisdiction.123 
As the FBI was specifically requesting that Apple load an operating system onto 
the device so that the government could break the device password, the agency thought 
use of the AWA was appropriate.124 Apple’s legal team thought otherwise and litigation 
ensued.125 The judge in this case asked Apple if complying with this request would result 
in an excessive burden to the company.126 Apple replied that unlocking one device would 
not constitute such a burden, but that costs increase with each additional device the 
government seeks to access and, “compliance with the court order could substantially 
tarnish Apple’s brand.127 Before the case could be fully adjudicated, the FBI withdrew its 
request because a third-party, acting on the agency’s behalf, gained access to the 
device.128  
Though technology companies cite customer privacy as a major concern, there is 
public support for compliance. A February 2016 Pew poll revealed that 51% of 
Americans surveyed thought that Apple should assist the FBI by unlocking the device 
obtained from the San Bernardino shooter.129 The poll also showed that 38% were 
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opposed to Apple complying with the request and 11% undecided.130 In addition, 
Apple’s assertion that its customer’s privacy was paramount rings somewhat hollow in 
light of the German litigation in which the company was embroiled.131 In 2012, the 
“Federation of German Consumer Organisations” initiated legislation against Apple for 
“unfair contractual clauses.”132 Specifically, Apple shared aggregated customer data with 
its associated businesses, and reserved the right to exploit this data to enhance and market 
the company’s devices and capabilities.133 In addition, Apple stored personally 
identifiable information on relatives and others that its customers provided when 
purchasing gift certificates or accessing other services.134 The German court ruled that 
Apple infringed upon the country’s privacy laws by allowing for far-reaching use of 
customer data.135 Customers did not know how their information was being used and the 
offended parties also lacked control of the data that was accumulated without their 
knowledge.136 Apple’s policies in the United States are comparable, and the deployment 
of enhanced encryption does not prevent the company from collecting customer data for 
its own use.137  
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
This section covers proposed federal, state and international legislation. Bi-
partisan federal legislation has been proposed to address this issue, but to date has not 
gained the traction necessary for passage.138 Similarly, legislators in New York, 
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California and Louisiana have introduced legislation for their respective states, but none 
have been signed into law.139 Conversely, several countries around the world have 
enacted legislation that affords the government the ability to access electronic 
communications conducted via various platforms.140 Perhaps these varying laws could be 
analyzed to determine if they could be employed in whole or in part in federal legislation. 
1. Federal Legislation 
Senators Richard Burr (NC-R) and Dianne Feinstein (CA-D) have drafted 
legislation to compel companies to decrypt data when served with proper legal 
process.141 The bill, known as the “Compliance with Court Orders Act,” requires that 
companies provide the government with data in a decrypted format if the companies’ 
features were responsible for encrypting the data.142 Technology companies oppose the 
act, stating that it will undermine the security of their devices and erode consumer 
trust.143 Ron Wyden, a Democratic Senator from Oregon, also opposed the measure, 
claiming it will make it illegal for Americans to protect their privacy.144 The Manhattan 
District Attorney supports this Act, but believes that it falls short in limiting the types of 
crime eligible for coverage.145 
The Manhattan District Attorney’s office authored a November 2015 report 
suggesting that the Federal government leverage the Commerce Clause to oblige 
technology firms and communication providers to make smartphone content available to 
                                                 
139 District Attorney, New York County, Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on 
Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety: An Update, 25, 26. 
140 Ibid., 27, 28; Dorle Hellmuth, “Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism, August 24, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20; Carla Bleiker, “New 
Surveillance Law: German Police Allowed to Hack Smartphones,” Deutsche Welle, June 22, 2017, http:// 
www.dw.com/en/new-surveillance-law-german-police-allowed-to-hack-smartphones/a-39372085. 




145 District Attorney, New York County, Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on 
Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety: An Update, 31. 
 22 
law enforcement.146 The assertion is that through this Clause, Congress has the authority 
to regulate goods that impact commerce, and a statute could be drafted to ensure 
smartphone access.147 The Manhattan DA wrote a follow-up report one year later 
suggesting legislation be enacted to compel device designers to preserve their ability to 
obtain data from phones when served with proper legal process.148 The intent of this 
proposed legislation is to reset the situation to that which was present prior to Apple 
releasing iOS 8.149 The report’s authors compare this proposed legislation to similar 
product safety laws, such as those requiring, “buildings to be constructed with exits and 
egresses that satisfy specific requirements, and roads to have maximum speed limits.”150  
2. State Legislation 
Legislation has been introduced at the state level by New York, California and 
Louisiana.151 In 2015, New York initiated legislation known as “Assembly Bill 
A.8093A.”152 This legislation stipulates that manufacturers retain the ability to decrypt or 
unlock all smartphones sold or leased in the state. Smartphone vendors that fail to comply 
would be subject to fines of $2,500 per device sold or leased. The New York bill has 
Democratic support, but it is unknown if it will be passed.153 California introduced 
Assembly Bill 1681 that mimics New York’s bill except that the $2,500 fine would be 
imposed against device or operating systems designers, not sellers.154 The legislation also 
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specifies that companies cannot pass these fines onto their customers.155 This bill lost 
traction in April 2016 and it is unknown if it will be retooled in hopes of passage.156 
Louisiana introduced House Bill 1040, also known as the Louisiana Brittney Mills Act in 
April 2016.157 The impetus for this bill was the murder of a woman, Brittney Mills, who 
was eight months pregnant.158 Mills’ baby, who was delivered the day that she was 
killed, died one week later.159 This bill was introduced because the victim’s phone was 
found at the crime scene and law enforcement believes the device may contain clues that 
could lead them to the perpetrator.160 Unfortunately, the phone is locked and law 
enforcement has not been able to gain access to the device or its contents, resulting in a 
stalled investigation.161 The Louisiana legislation is identical to New York’s proposed 
bill, with one exception.162 If the user of the device is a homicide victim, then the 
Attorney General is compelled to fine the seller or lessor, rather than having the option of 
seeking financial penalty.163 However, this bill has not yet passed.164 The most recent 
vote ended in a tie, with the opposition favoring federal legislation as a remedy.165 This 
bill is expected to be presented again at a later date.166  
Those opposed to using state legislation to address the encryption issue offer 
several reasons. Some legislators favor federal legislation over that of the state because of 
issues caused by frequent device portability.167 A user may change providers at will and 
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maintain his/her phone number. This means that for the duration of the period that the 
device is held by a user, it may be serviced by multiple providers in several states. 
Another reason some legislators prefer federal legislation is that New York and 
Louisiana’s proposed legislation seeks to penalize phone vendors in their respective 
states.168 However, if this legislation is passed, then vendors will likely relocate to 
neighboring states to continue their business.169 Regarding California’s proposed 
legislation, the recommended fines would only apply to devices that law enforcement 
attempted to access but could not.170 Therefore, the amounts would be too small in 
comparison to corporate revenues for them to act as effective deterrents.171 
3. International Legislation 
Citizens in Singapore and the United Kingdom must now provide their passcodes 
to law enforcement when legally compelled, or face criminal penalties.172 The United 
Kingdom can impose five-year sentences for non-compliance, while those in Singapore 
may face three years in prison, and/or a $10,000 fine for individuals who refuse to 
provide their passcodes for device decryption.173 Similar laws would not likely be passed 
in the United States, as they would infringe upon Fifth Amendment rights.174 The United 
Kingdom has also introduced additional legislation that has been approved by the House 
of Commons and is being reviewed by the House of Lords.175 This new legislation 
compels communication providers to disable any encryption that the provider has 
engineered into its devices.176 Companies are afforded the option of appealing to the 
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Secretary of State if they deem the process to be a financial burden or impractical 
request.177 Foreign companies are not bound by this pending legislation.178  
Police in France were granted the authority in 2011 to install spyware on target 
computers, allowing for real time, covert examinations.179 In addition, French lawmakers 
are considering legislation that would imprison and fine technology executives for 
spurning law enforcement’s requests to access devices in terrorism cases.180 
Germany passed legislation in June 2017, known as the Source 
Telecommunications and Online Surveillance Law.181 This legislation provides German 
law enforcement with the authority to install spyware onto a target device and view 
content in the same manner as the user.182 
The Netherlands considered legislation that would compel communication 
providers and device designers to cooperate with law enforcement in accessing encrypted 
data.183 However, in January 2016, the government declared that it would not seek to 
enact this law.184 
European Union members France and Germany brought the encryption issue to 
the forefront in August 2016, when they suggested that the coalition implement 
requirements compelling communication providers to assist law enforcement with access 
to encrypted data.185 The collaborative effort focused on accessing communications in 
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terrorist investigations while safeguarding individual privacy.186 The status of this 
proposal is unknown.  
As of July 2017, China has mandated that Apple remove applications from its 
App Store that allow Chinese citizens to bypass the country’s firewall.187 Chinese 
officials claim that these networks are illegal in their country, while those opposed claim 
that by complying Apple is effectively facilitating censorship.188 Apple is complying 
with this mandate.189 China is second only to the United States in Apple’s market 
share.190  
C. STAKEHOLDER STANDPOINTS 
This section examines the varied positions of the main stakeholders. Privacy 
experts claim that softening encryption in any way would pose a danger to all users.191 
Whereas, technology companies fear that intellectual property would be at risk if back 
doors were introduced into their products.192 Conversely, law enforcement maintains the 
position that design designers and communication providers could provide required 
assistance without unduly compromising individual privacy or corporate intellectual 
property.193 Following is a more detailed review of the chasm between the various 
stakeholders. 
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1. Privacy Concerns 
Many privacy experts assert that providing law enforcement with the access it 
requires would undermine security for all users.194 Once it becomes known that devices 
have particular vulnerabilities, then bad actors will work to identify and exploit the 
weaknesses.195 Corporations are also concerned that these vulnerabilities may be used to 
gain access to their code and reverse engineer their products.196 However, many of the 
highly-publicized cyber-attacks that have recently occurred were the result of malware, 
phishing or outdated security software.197 Enhanced encryption does not guard against 
these vulnerabilities; therefore, the attacks on Target (2014), the Office of Personnel 
Management (2015) and the Democratic National Committee (2016) would have still 
occurred even if enhanced encryption were in place.198 Instead, enhanced encryption 
impedes law enforcement’s capability to thoroughly investigate these and similar 
crimes.199 Many technology companies tout enhanced encryption as a major selling point 
and claim that their international sales would suffer if forced to modify their 
encryption.200 The State Department and the Commerce Department have warned that 
foreign governments hostile to their own citizenry may exploit known vulnerabilities to 
persecute dissidents.201 
2. Government Perspective 
Apple and Google claim that their most recently released operating systems were 
engineered with enhanced encryption to protect their customers and corporate intellectual 
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property.202 However, the Manhattan District Attorney’s report asserts that no known 
vulnerabilities were reported that would have accounted for both companies engineering 
such significant changes.203 Further, the report states that a bad actor would need 
physical custody of a specific device in order to access the content.204 Therefore, even if 
one were to illegally gain access to Apple’s decryption methods, access would be denied 
without the device.205  
What is puzzling is why both companies comply with legal process when it comes 
to customer data stored on the cloud.206 Why have Apple and Google made the 
engineering decision to make cloud-stored data accessible, and not data stored on 
individual devices?207 Apple states in its legal process guidelines that the company is 
able to access some customer data stored via iCloud because it maintains custody of 
encryption keys.208 Apple’s General Counsel testified that data stored on the cloud is 
indeed encrypted, but not in the same way as its phones.209 Examples of some of the data 
available from iCloud include text, email and voicemail messages.210 However, 
following the Snowden leaks, Apple made the conscious decision, which it also used as a 
marketing tool, to engineer devices using iOS 8 or later with end-to-end encryption 
removing the company from the access equation.211 If Apple is sincere in its argument 
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that it is fighting the government to preserve customer privacy, why does it maintain 
iCloud encryption keys?212  
It should also be noted that the deployment of enhanced encryption would not 
have shielded the public from the massive data collection carried out by the NSA, which 
seems to be the impetus for Apple’s decision to lock out law enforcement.213 Apple itself 
was reported to be one of nine companies that previously participated in the NSA’s 
PRISM program.214 PRISM reportedly allowed the NSA direct server access to 
communications from the participating entities.215 Apple and Google have denied 
granting the NSA such access.216 
The Manhattan DA attempted to engage both Apple and Google to determine the 
companies’ respective perceived threats that led the corporations to alter their designs and 
deploy enhanced encryption.217 The DA sent letters to both companies in hopes of 
obtaining answers to the following questions, with the first inquiry pertaining only to 
Apple:218 
If Apple kept a “key” so that it was able to unlock iPhones, would the 
iPhones be more vulnerable to hackers than if Apple had no such “key”? 
Is there any “key” or similar device that Apple might keep without 
sacrificing the security of iPhones from hackers? Is there a way to measure 
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or quantify the vulnerability to hackers of iPhones (a) if Apple kept a key, 
as compared to (b) if it did not keep a key?219 
In iOS 7 and prior operating systems, and in Android systems prior to 
Lollipop 5.0, if an attacker learned Apple’s or Google’s decryption 
process, could [the attacker] use it to remotely attack devices or would he 
need possession of the device?220 
What technical problem does the full-disk encryption of iOS 8 and 
Lollipop 5.0 solve? Quantify the problem to the extent possible. For 
example, if the largest security threat posed by prior systems was a hacker 
hacking Apple’s or Google’s systems to gain access to the decryption 
process, what are the chances of this? Has it happened before? If the 
largest security threat posed by prior systems was an insider improperly 
sharing Apple’s or Google’s decryption process, has this happened before? 
What security protocols are in place to make sure this doesn’t happen? 
What are the chances of them being breached?221 
Neither Apple nor Google responded to the Manhattan DA’s inquiry.222 However, 
below is an exchange between Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the Committee on the 
Judiciary House of Representatives and Apple’s Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel Bruce Sewell, which occurred in writing subsequent to the March 2016 
testimony. 
Goodlatte: How did Apple decrypt iPhones operating on the iOS 7 or an 
earlier operating system? Was this done remotely or in-house? 
Sewell: In the past, using an in-house process, Apple was able to extract 
data that was not protected by passcode-protected encryption. This applies 
to iPhones running iOS 7 and earlier operating systems. 
Goodlatte: Was the technology you possessed to decrypt these phones 
ever compromised? 
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Sewell: The process Apple used to extract data from locked iPhones 
running iOS 7 or earlier operating systems was not, to our knowledge, 
compromised.223 
Apple’s response counters the private sector argument that enhanced encryption 
was added to safeguard customer privacy and intellectual property. Providers have 
previously claimed that maintaining decryption keys creates significant insider and 
hacking threats.224 However, Apple’s General Counsel acknowledged on the record that 
Apple’s prior operating systems that lacked enhanced encryption were never 
compromised.225 
D. REASONS FOR IMPASSE 
Over time, the relationships that law enforcement previously enjoyed with the 
corporate world appear to have deteriorated. For instance, CALEA was enacted to 
mandate that telecommunication providers engineer their devices and systems in such a 
way as to provide law enforcement with assistance in accessing communications.226 As 
directed, these providers made the required modifications and complied with this law. 
Now, Apple argues that being forced to assist law enforcement violates the corporation’s 
First and Fifth Amendment rights.227 In addition, Apple claims that its decision to 
enhance device encryption was based on the company’s desire to protect individual 
privacy.228 However, the corporation’s own practices led German courts to rule that 
Apple infringed upon that country’s privacy laws.229 Admittedly, legislation has not kept 
pace with the myriad forms of emerging communication platforms and enhanced 
encryption techniques. Various pieces of legislation have been proposed at the state and 
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federal levels, and some more stringent laws have been passed in other countries. 
Through judicial and legislative debates, privacy experts stand firm in their belief that 
providing government with the access it requires would necessitate introducing 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by bad actors, thereby endangering individual 
privacy, dissident safety, intellectual property and corporate profits.230 The government 
on the other hand questions why Apple and Google have gone to such lengths to enhance 
their encryption when Apple confirmed that the process it previously used to assist law 
enforcement had never been compromised.231 Further, law enforcement stresses that it is 
not seeking additional powers.232 Agencies merely want to maintain the ability to access 
communications so that they can successfully fulfill their respective missions 
unhindered.233 Clearly, the stakeholders are separated by a deep chasm due to their 
disparate views and motivations. These differences may present the largest hurdle in 
solving this problem. 
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III. “GOING DARK” VERSUS THE “GOLDEN AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE” 
This chapter assesses the claim espoused by some privacy experts that new 
technology may actually provide law enforcement with innovative intercept capabilities 
that may compensate for the access they lose due to enhanced encryption. The reporting 
of wiretap statistics, and their availability and subsequent impact are also discussed. 
Included in these statistics are some of the types of crime where electronic interceptions 
are employed.  
A. THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE  
Valerie Caproni, the former General Counsel for the FBI, defined the “Going 
Dark” phenomenon as follows: “The widening gap between law enforcement’s legal 
privilege to intercept electronic communications and its practical ability to actually 
intercept those communications.”234 This gap has widened further still as Facebook 
announced that it will make it easier for its 900 million users to encrypt their 
communications.235 As it now stands, targets of investigation can communicate 
surreptitiously on various platforms free from detection.236 James Comey, the former 
Director of the FBI, has warned that law enforcement is facing the issue of “Going Dark” 
in regards to accessing communications that were previously available.237 In March 
2016, Comey gave testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary House of 
Representatives in which he stated that, “technology has allowed us to create zones of 
complete privacy.”238 Comey further stated that these “zones prohibit any government 
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action under the Fourth Amendment or under our search authority.”239 Representative 
Henry Johnson Jr. from Georgia replied, “Well, it’s actually a zone of impunity, would it 
not be, a zone where bad things can happen and the security of Americans can be placed 
at risk?”240 Representative Trey Gowdy from South Carolina added, “the right to 
counsel, the right to free speech, the right to a jury trial just isn’t of much use if you are 
dead, so I reconcile those competing principles in favor of public safety.”241 Gowdy 
commented further, “National security, there’s nothing that the government has a more 
compelling interest in than that, and we’re going to create evidence-free zones?”242 
Representative Gowdy closed his remarks by commenting on Apple’s stance in regard to 
the San Bernardino case: 
So Apple, on the one hand, wants us to kind of weigh and balance privacy, 
except they have done it for us. They have said at least as it relates to this 
phone, we’ve already done that weighing and balancing, and there is no 
governmental interest compelling enough for us to allow you to try to 
guess the password of a dead person’s phone that is owned by a city 
government. There’s no balancing to be done. They have already done it 
for us.243 
Cyrus Vance, Jr., the District Attorney for New York County, testified in this 
same hearing that criminals use electronic devices to plot and carry out their illicit 
activity, and they are very much aware that enhanced encryption provides a safe 
communications haven.244 DA Vance added the following anecdote to his testimony. “In 
one lawfully recorded phone conversation from Rikers Island in New York, an inmate, 
talking about the iOS 8 default device encryption, called it, and I’m quoting, ‘a gift from 
God.’”245 DA Vance supplemented his testimony with the following statement: 
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So centuries of jurisprudence that have been talked about today have held 
that no item, not a home, a file cabinet, a safe, or even a smartphone, is 
beyond the reach of a court-ordered search warrant. But the warrant-proof 
encryption today gives two very large companies, we believe, functional 
control over the path to justice for victims of crime, including who could 
be prosecuted and, importantly, who may be exonerated.246  
DA Vance submitted the following as part of his written statement to the 
committee members: 
In the absence of uniform policy, our nation will effectively delegate the 
crafting of national security and law enforcement policy to board rooms in 
Silicon Valley. That is, important responsibilities of our government will 
be carried out by Apple, Google and other technology companies, who 
will advance the best interests of their shareholders, not necessarily the 
best interests of our nation.247  
Technology companies should not be able to dictate who can access key 
evidence in criminal investigations. No device or company, no matter how 
popular, should be able to exempt itself from court obligations 
unilaterally.248 
DA Vance submitted the following to the committee in a written exchange 
following his March 2016 testimony:249 
Chairman Goodlatte: “In your law enforcement career, how would you 
rank this issue of encryption in terms of complicating investigations?”250 
Vance: “Apple’s introduction of a product that is beyond the reach of a 
search warrant into the stream of commerce is—and marketing the product 
as warrant-proof – is entirely unprecedented. One of the largest companies 
in the world intentionally and explicitly frustrating its own ability to 
comply with court orders is entirely unprecedented.”251 
Police in Toronto, Canada, have reported reading chat messages between 
pedophiles stating that those operating in the United States are at an advantage because 
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they cannot be compelled by law enforcement to reveal their passcodes.252 The author(s) 
of the chat messages maintained that refusing to reveal passcodes will not result in 
incarceration, instead, law enforcement will be forced to close the case due to lack of 
evidence.253  
B. “THE GOLDEN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE” 
In contrast to the “Going Dark” issue, some privacy experts have asserted that law 
enforcement is enjoying the “Golden Age of Surveillance” due to the accessibility of 
metadata and the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT).254 Both sources have the 
potential to be exploited in a myriad of ways to identify subjects and speed case 
progression.255 Privacy experts contend that the public’s willingness to adopt 
technological innovations provides the government with an advantage.256 The most 
recent example is the popular in-home electronic assistant. Amazon reportedly sold 
millions of the company’s versions, known as Alexa and Echo during the 2017 holiday 
season.257 These devices perform a variety of tasks based on voice commands, such as 
controlling the thermostat and lights in one’s home, placing telephone calls, and 
arranging trips.258 In-home electronic assistants and other IoT devices offer the potential 
to intercept conversations and collect video and other useful data from a subject’s 
home.259 In addition, law enforcement has successfully served proper legal process on 
OnStar and similar companies to obtain audio and geo-location information from subject 
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vehicles.260 Another example of the public’s widespread adoption of technology is the 
prodigious use of text messages to communicate during the last 25 years.261 CNN 
reported in 2012 that U.S. citizens send 2.2 trillion text messages annually.262 Professor 
and privacy expert Peter Swire claims that providers can provide law enforcement with 
the content of the majority of text messages.263 Swire contends that law enforcement’s 
access to metadata for those text messages that are encrypted should not be 
discounted.264 Prior to the widespread adoption of electronic communications, many 
meetings between investigative targets could remain clandestine.265 Now, privacy experts 
maintain, the accessibility of metadata provides law enforcement with the ability to 
identify an individual’s pattern of life and close associates.266 These associates could 
then be exploited to further an investigation.267 However, as the Snowden leaks became 
public, more and more providers added or enhanced their encryption. In addition, 
metadata is only useful to a point. In the case of a kidnapping or terrorist act or plot, 
access to content is vital. Dates, times, durations of calls, as well as the other party’s 
phone number will not disclose where a victim may be held or when and where an attack 
is planned. Privacy experts have conceded that there are certain devices and 
communications that law enforcement is unable to access due to enhanced encryption, 
but maintain that the extensive digital footprints that are created by the public present a 
trove of information.268  
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C. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDERS' VARYING VIEWS 
This section explores the various issues that may be contributing to the divergent 
stakeholder positions. Legislators and privacy experts may be unaware of the depth of the 
problem due to an underreporting of statistics.269 In addition, certain communication 
platforms have become impossible to intercept, leading law enforcement to eschew 
seeking legal process altogether and leaving these instances unreported.270 Law 
enforcement may also be concerned with alienating the judiciary if they pursue intercepts 
where success in obtaining the required information is questionable.271 Furthermore, to 
remain effective, law enforcement is intensively protective of its capabilities and its 
limitations. Finally, until somewhat recently, there was no mechanism in place to capture 
statistics for electronic devices seized by state and local law enforcement agencies, 
further cloaking the extent of the problem.272 These factors are further explored below. 
1. Incomplete Wiretap Statistics
Privacy experts point to the dearth of publically available information to 
strengthen their argument that law enforcement overstates the threat encryption poses to 
investigations.273 Annually, state and federal prosecutors are required to report to the 
court statistics on Title III wiretap investigations, which the court then reports to 
Congress.274 (See the Appendix for an example of the form used by prosecutors to report 
wiretap statistics to the court.) Included in these statistics is the number of instances that 
law enforcement has encountered encryption that it could not surmount.275 These 
reported statistics are relatively low in comparison to the number of intercepts 
conducted.276 However, the statistics reported for 2016 reflect a sharp spike in the 
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number of instances insurmountable encryption was encountered. Additionally, it should 
be noted that these figures are impacted by reports not received in time to include in the 
annual statistics and by prosecutors’ decisions to delay reporting in order to protect 
ongoing investigations.277 The reasoning behind prosecutorial decisions to delay 
reporting seems to be without merit as no target-specific information is reported.278 
Remarkably, roughly one-third of wiretap statistics are missing from the annual 
reporting, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.279 The reason for 
non-compliance with this mandate remains unclear, but if the statistics from 2016 are any 
indication, the instances of insurmountable may continue to rise. Table 1 breaks down the 
number of wiretap intercepts, the number of instances that insurmountable encryption 
was encountered, and the number of intercept statistics not reported during the period 
2012–2016. This data encompasses nationwide reporting from state and federal 
prosecutors.  
Table 1.   Title III Intercept Statistics280 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total Intercepts 3,395 3,576 3,554 4,148 3,168 
Insurmountable Encryption Encountered 4 9 4 11 101 
Intercept Statistics Not Reported 846 1,198 1,081 1,369 903 
Note: 2012 is the first year insurmountable encryption was reported to the court. 
 
2. Reluctance to Pursue Electronic Interceptions 
This reporting also excludes how often law enforcement declines to pursue an 
intercept once it is determined that a particular encryption method or application is in use. 
For instance, it is becoming more widely known that the application WhatsApp uses 
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encryption methods that law enforcement cannot penetrate.281 WhatsApp has deployed 
end-to-end encryption, making it impossible for the company to provide law enforcement 
with message content.282 As the process for obtaining judicial authority to conduct an 
intercept is arduous and time-consuming, not to mention costly if approved, law 
enforcement is not likely to petition for a WhatsApp or similar intercept. Therefore, the 
many times that law enforcement encounters these issues and refrains from petitioning 
for an intercept will not be captured in the statistics reported to the court. 
3. Fear Judiciary May Decline Future Requests for Electronic Intercepts 
In addition, if law enforcement were to push forward affidavits to the court for all 
types of devices and applications, regardless of their past interception success rate, the 
judiciary may be less inclined to approve future requests.283 As part of the affidavit 
process, law enforcement is required to prove “exhaustion,” which means that all other 
reasonable methods have been unsuccessful or pose too much of a risk to pursue, leaving 
the Title III intercept as the only remaining option.284 However, in the affidavit law 
enforcement is required to define what it expects to derive from the interception, and if 
the agency knows that a device or application is impenetrable, then this would have to be 
disclosed. Neither law enforcement nor the court can afford to waste time on such a 
laborious process.  
4. Law Enforcement’s Reluctance to Report Vulnerabilities 
The issue is exacerbated by law enforcement’s long-time habit of guarding 
investigative techniques. This protection extends to roadblocks encountered. If criminals 
and terrorists are aware that a certain device or platform provides impenetrable 
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anonymity, they will likely embrace its use. Once a case progresses to the trial phase, 
many investigative techniques are disclosed. If this disclosure is widely publicized, then 
criminal entities learn and adapt, placing law enforcement at a disadvantage regarding 
future investigations. This may explain law enforcement’s reluctance to share its 
successes and failures publicly, except as required by the courts. Hence, the private 
sector, which is in the best position to assist the government, sees only a fragment of the 
problem due to the protective practices of law enforcement.  
5. Devices in Evidence: Incomplete Reporting of Encryption Issues 
A 2016 report prepared by the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office highlights the 
extent of the problem. The Manhattan DA reported that since Apple engineered the iOS 8 
with enhanced encryption, the forensics lab under its jurisdiction has been unable to 
access the contents of 423 devices in its possession.285 Further, DA Cyrus Vance, Jr., 
stated that in some cases, investigations have completely stalled due to insufficient 
information.286 This number is expected to climb significantly as approximately 96% of 
all smartphones are Apple or Google devices, and overtime older devices will be replaced 
with newer models with default encryption.287 What some may fail to consider is that 
information extracted from devices is not only used to indict targets, but it may also be 
used to exonerate the innocent.288 As these are devices in the possession of law 
enforcement, they would not have been included in the wiretap statistics reported to the 
court, since extracting data from seized devices is a different process than conducting 
electronic intercepts. Nevertheless, the information reported by the Manhattan District 
Attorney shows how widespread the problem is and that it impacts more than federal law 
enforcement agencies.  
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For instance, a few state and local law enforcement agencies have reported similar 
investigative roadblocks, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Reported Encryption Issues–State/Local Agencies289 
Agency Devices Crime Category 
Harris County DA—TX 8–10 per week Many Homicides 
Suffolk County DA—MA 151 Sex Crimes, Homicides, Larcenies 
Los Angeles, CA 
(Agency not specified) 
300 Not Listed 
WI Department of Justice 68 Not Listed 
 
The Manhattan District Attorney’s office has partnered with state and local law 
enforcement agencies and the National Domestic Communications Assistance Center to 
develop a system to better collect and track incidents in which law enforcement 
encounters insurmountable encryption.290 A website has been created and as of 
November 2016, law enforcement agencies from twenty-three states have contributed 
statistical data.291 The goal is to gain a more complete picture of how widespread the 
issue is so that appropriate steps can be taken to rectify the problem.292  
D. PREVALENCE OF NARCOTICS CASES DIMINISHING ENCRYPTION 
ISSUE? 
The previously cited Pew poll revealed that 51% of Americans thought that law 
enforcement should be able to access the San Bernardino terrorist’s phone.293 As a result, 
law enforcement may find that it is possible to garner public support to combat terrorism 
and solve violent crime. However, the types of crime that Title III interceptions are most 
typically associated with may pose an issue. Although electronic interceptions are 
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certainly employed for terrorist cases and other life-or-death investigations, such as 
kidnappings, the vast majority are related to narcotics cases.294 Indeed, Apple accused 
the FBI of cherry-picking the San Bernardino terrorist case in the hopes of swaying the 
public, judiciary and lawmakers alike.295 As more states legalize marijuana for medical, 
as well as personal use, public support for intercepts related to narcotic investigations 
could wane. The acceptance of drug use may cause a shift in the court of public opinion, 
resulting in lawmakers reallocating taxpayer dollars and law enforcement assets to areas 
other than narcotics.  
However, even if legislators and members of the public become more tolerant of 
drug use and less concerned with prosecuting narcotic-related crimes, there is another 
issue worthy of consideration. There have been documented cases of narcotics proceeds 
being used to facilitate terrorist financing.296 Hezbollah, in order to sponsor terrorist 
activities, is reported to be in collusion with South American drug cartels to smuggle 
large quantities of cocaine.297 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported 
that when Madrid suffered a terrorist attack, narcotics were used as currency.298 
Therefore, it is not out of the realm of possibility that successful narcotics investigations 
could potentially disrupt terrorism. 
For purposes of Figure 1, only violent crimes and narcotics were included. It 
should be noted that in the wiretap statistics reported to the court, terrorism is not listed 
as a criminal category.299 Violent crimes are segmented and a catch-all category labeled 
“Other” is also used.300  
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Figure 1.  Title III Intercept Crime Statistics301 
E. A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 
The FBI’s former director and general counsel have raised the issue of the “Going 
Dark” problem and have stated that criminals and terrorists can exploit these encrypted 
communication platforms to engage in nefarious activity.302 Judiciary House 
Representative Henry Johnson, Jr. labeled the protections that these platforms provide as 
a “zone of impunity.”303 Representative Trey Gowdy lamented that Apple has 
commandeered legislative authority by creating devices and encryption that are immune 
to warrants and other legal process.304 New York DA Cyrus Vance, Jr., voiced his 
concern that Silicon Valley companies have placed themselves in the position to decide 
what is best for the public, instead of elected officials.305 DA Vance provided anecdotal 
evidence that criminals are aware of enhanced encryption and are exploiting it for 
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criminal purposes.306 Conversely, privacy experts claim that fast-paced innovation and 
early user adoption have provided law enforcement with numerous options for data 
collection.307 Many tout the government’s ability to obtain metadata as a law 
enforcement windfall.308 Although, communication content is not included in this 
information, privacy experts claim that if appropriately analyzed, law enforcement can 
link subjects in a conspiracy and determine patterns of life.309 However, if such cases 
proceed to the trial phase, more information would likely be required for evidentiary 
purposes. Without message content or voice recordings, a subject would be able to claim 
that someone else was in possession of their device and used it without their knowledge. 
In addition, content would be required to determine terrorist plot specifics. Privacy 
experts have called on the government to publicly define investigative needs and 
hurdles.310 However, doing so would force law enforcement to tip its investigative hand, 
allowing criminals and terrorists alike to gain insight and adjust their practices 
accordingly. Privacy experts believe that if law enforcement is not forthcoming with this 
information, then the situation must not be all that dire.311 The lack of timely 
prosecutorial reporting whether justified or not, does little to help the government’s cause 
in enlisting the help of the private sector. However, a problem is unlikely to be solved if 
the public and their elected representatives are unaware of the seriousness of the issue. 
This seems to be an additional area where existing policy falls short. 
  
                                                 
306 H.R., Encryption Tightrope, 131; Greenblatt and Cribb, “Encrypted Evidence.” 
307 Swire and Oliver, “The Golden Age.” 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Abelson et al., “Keys under Doormats,” 3–4. 
311 Conor Friedersdorf, “Is Law Enforcement Crying Wolf about the Dangers of Locked Phones?” 
Atlantic, February 19, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/is-law-enforcement-
crying-wolf-about-the-dangers-of-locked-phones/470055/. 
 46 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47 
IV. ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION METHODS 
The first section of this chapter focuses on the various enhanced encryption 
methods currently available to safeguard devices, which also have the effect of creating 
roadblocks for law enforcement in its efforts to access communication content. The 
second section of this chapter focuses on the possible decryption techniques that law 
enforcement could employ to capture electronic communications in furtherance of 
investigations. Theoretically, some of these options have the potential to solve the going 
dark issue by compelling the private sector to assist law enforcement, or by allowing law 
enforcement to bypass, but not inhibit, the use of enhanced encryption through new 
methods. Three former senior officials from the National Security Agency (NSA), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DOD) assert 
that enhanced encryption protects the nation, its citizens, and businesses and should not 
be compromised for the sake of law enforcement.312 These senior officials posited that 
law enforcement was resourceful and through adaptation and innovation would find a 
solution to this issue.313 Many of the options detailed below have been proposed in the 
past, but to date privacy experts and technology companies have yet to agree on a 
solution.  
A. ENHANCED ENCRYPTION 
This section analyzes the various forms of enhanced encryption. One method, 
known as forward secrecy, provides strong protection against intrusion by creating fresh 
keys for every process.314 Device content remains incomprehensible until the passcode is 
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keyed when full-disk encryption is employed.315 When end-to-end encryption is used, 
message content is unreadable until it reaches the intended recipient’s device.316 Another 
option, symmetric encryption, introduces a code into the message that decrypts the 
content, but this method is not without risk.317 Lastly, asymmetric encryption creates 
keys to encrypt and decrypt message content.318 However, this form of encryption carries 
with it a practical limitation.319 What follows is a detailed explanation of the known 
enhanced encryption techniques currently in use.  
1. Forward Secrecy  
Unique encryption keys are created for every operation the device processes when 
forward secrecy is employed.320 Therefore, if a bad actor were to gain access to a device, 
then only the data from the time of the intrusion would be jeopardized.321 Encryption of 
earlier data would stay intact and any operations occurring after the breach would also be 
protected.322 A further precaution designed in forward secrecy is the erasure of keys 
following every operation.323 Similarly, authenticated encryption, which assures privacy 
and confirms a message has not been altered, may not be widely used if it becomes 
known that vulnerabilities have been added.324 Privacy experts also argue that 
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engineering devices with backdoors or vulnerabilities would endanger innovation and 
inhibit the widespread adoption of forward secrecy.325  
2. Full-Disk Encryption 
Apple’s iOS 8 defaults to full-disk encryption.326 According to an Apple iOS 
Security white paper from March 2017: 
iOS and iOS devices provide advanced security features, and yet they’re 
also easy to use. Many of these features are enabled by default, so IT 
departments don’t need to perform extensive configurations. And key 
security features like device encryption aren’t configurable, so users can’t 
disable them by mistake.327  
Until the correct password is keyed, full-disk encryption makes all data on the 
device indecipherable.328 If a user’s device falls into the hands of a third party, full-disk 
encryption prevents the third party from accessing the stored data.329 Some users may 
experience negative consequences due to the deployment of full-disk encryption. If a user 
forgets his/her passcode and has not backed up data, the information stored on the device 
will likely be irretrievable.330 However, if customer data was backed up to a cloud 
storage system, they may be able to restore their historical data.331 As Apple, Google and 
other companies are intentionally removing themselves from the access equation, they are 
limiting their customer’s choices and the ability to assist them, as well as law 
enforcement. 
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3. End-to-End Encryption  
Another technique used to protect data is end-to-end encryption. End-to-end 
encryption ensures that once a message is sent, it remains encrypted until it reaches the 
intended recipient.332 The intended recipient’s device has the only key capable of 
decrypting the message. The message cannot be intercepted and decrypted in-transit.333 
The server used to carry the message from the sender to the recipient acts as a transporter 
only and cannot read the communications.334  
4. Symmetric Encryption 
A commonly used method to secure communications is symmetric encryption, 
also referred to as secret key encryption.335 Users of symmetric encryption insert an 
alpha-numeric combination into the communication to modify the content.336 Through 
the use of this secret key, the sender and the recipient can encrypt and decipher their 
communications.337 However, the secret key is vulnerable if one of the parties falls prey 
to hackers.338  
5. Asymmetric Encryption 
Some devices have programs installed that use an algorithm to create a unique set 
of keys.339 These keys are known as asymmetric or public/private keys.340 The private 
key is safeguarded, and the public key can be shared with any user.341 Encrypting a 
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communication with one of the keys in the set requires the use of the second key to 
decipher the message.342 The drawback with using asymmetric keys is the protracted 
processing time, approximately one-thousand times slower than symmetric key 
encryption, which makes them unfeasible for sizeable messages.343  
B. DECRYPTION/ACCESS TECHNIQUES 
Following is an analysis of the varying decryption techniques as well as other 
avenues that law enforcement may explore in the future to access electronic 
communications. The use of split-key encryption allows law enforcement the access it 
has enjoyed in the past, while providing a check and balance since two entities must work 
together to obtain device content.344 Signing updates could be sent to specific devices to 
allow law enforcement to break passwords to access stored data or load spyware for 
interception purposes.345 Germany has recently granted law enforcement the authority to 
install spyware on target devices to overcome the encryption issue.346 Legal hacking, 
whereby the government employs individuals with the skills necessary to access the 
myriad communication devices and platforms currently available, is a somewhat 
controversial solution some privacy experts support.347 Another option that has been 
suggested is compelling users to divulge their passcodes.348 However, this method brings 
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up Fifth Amendment issues.349 Others have recommended that law enforcement rely on 
data that has been stored in the cloud to meet its investigative needs, but this process has 
not yet been widely adopted and those who do employ it may not do so with any 
regularity.350 When key escrow is employed, an extra key is created that could be held by 
the device designer or law enforcement in the event access to content is necessary.351 
Finally, some experts believe that the Internet of Things will provide law enforcement 
with new intercept techniques that will compensate for its current inability to access 
certain devices.352 A detailed discussion of these techniques follows. 
1. Split-Key Encryption 
Split-key encryption would prevent any one entity from gaining access to a 
device.353 This method requires the key to be divided into at least two parts, depending 
on the number entities involved, so that no one entity would be able to unilaterally 
decrypt content.354 Theoretically, successful decryption would require the collaboration 
of two or more parties, such as the FBI and Apple.355 In this example, the FBI would 
obtain and serve Apple with proper legal process. Apple would then work with an FBI 
representative and each entity would use their portion of the key to access the device and 
decrypt the data.356 This lessens the likelihood that a single organization would be 
vulnerable to hackers seeking a specific key.357 As the key is split, hackers would have to 
successfully infiltrate two organizations.358 The Director of the NSA, Michael Rogers, is 
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a proponent of the split-key option.359 This method protects against the insider threat 
posed by private sector employees and the potential abuse of authority by government 
entities.360 This collaboration may also have the added benefit of fostering closer 
associations between the government and corporations.  
2. Signing Updates 
Some providers, including Apple, use signing updates to push out system updates 
including the latest operating system or security patches to their customers.361 Apple 
devices, for instance, default to automatic updates for users employing the most current 
operating systems.362 Updates automatically download in the background then users 
receive a message informing them that an update is available.363 Apple gives the user two 
options at this stage: “Install Now” or “Remind Me Later.”364 Therefore, unless the user 
takes steps to disable this feature, automatic updates will occur when the device is 
plugged in and the user selects one of the installation options.365 This process could also 
be used to load a different operating system onto a device that would allow law 
enforcement to mount a brute-force attack.366 A brute-force attack is one in which law 
enforcement uses specially designed computer programs to attempt to break the device’s 
password and gain access by rapidly trying a series of passwords until one is found that 
works.367 The signing update could be specifically designed to remove the rate-limiting 
feature. Rate-limiting is a feature designed to prevent brute-force attacks, as it requires a 
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certain period of time to lapse before additional password attempts can be made.368 This 
makes the process time-prohibitive for law enforcement.369 Further, many devices have 
features that remove all useful data if too many unsuccessful password attempts are 
made.370 Signing updates could also be used to load spyware onto a device so that law 
enforcement, armed with proper legal process, could monitor the device.371 However, 
those opposed believe it would encourage consumers to avoid updates, placing their 
privacy at risk.372  
3. Germany’s State Trojan  
Germany is taking a new approach to combatting the encryption issue that 
employs a hybrid of the signing updates and legal hacking options. As the result of 
multiple terrorist attacks that have plagued Europe, German lawmakers voted in June 
2017 to help law enforcement gain access to encrypted communications.373 Germany 
reported that 85% of the country’s communications are encrypted.374 These factors 
combined were the impetus behind the Bundestag passing this legislation, known as the 
Source Telecommunications and Online Surveillance Law, to help law enforcement 
bridge the gap created when communication providers and device designers began 
engineering their products with enhanced encryption.375 Effective July 1, 2017, German 
authorities have been granted authority to install spyware, known as a State Trojan, onto 
target devices when armed with proper legal process.376 This technique allows law 
enforcement to collect the content of messages in real time, and view the messages just as 
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the intended recipient would.377 Installing the State Trojan permits law enforcement to 
see the message before it is sent and more importantly before it is encrypted.378 The State 
Trojan may also be installed on the recipient’s device that would enable law enforcement 
to intercept the message once it has been decrypted by the user’s device.379 This new 
legislation also authorizes law enforcement to access stored content on individual devices 
or systems.380  
The passage of this law is remarkable considering how staunchly protective 
Germany is of individual privacy rights.381 For decades, East German citizens were 
subjected to continuous and overreaching surveillance by the Stasi.382 This surveillance 
included the most intimate details of innocent citizens’ lives.383 During this time, the 
Stasi reportedly maintained records on one-third of the population.384 German citizens 
were also among the most outspoken against the NSA’s activities following Snowden’s 
revelations.385 However, outrage against these episodes may have been overshadowed by 
the four terrorist attacks the country suffered in 2016 alone.386 Lawmakers may have 
realized that guarding these rights may be in direct conflict with law enforcement’s goals 
and responsibilities, which provided the traction necessary for ratification.387 
Nevertheless, this law is not without controversy and was opposed by Greens party 
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members and those on the far left.388 At this time, it is unknown if the device user/target 
would be aware that the spyware has been inserted, and therefore alerted to law 
enforcement’s actions. As the results of this method remain untested, at least publicly, it 
is possible that the initial loading of the spyware could result in slower device response 
times, which could present a red flag to the device user/target. However, after the 
installation process is complete, any impeded device performance may return to normal. 
Passage of this law in Germany may increase the chances that it will be modeled in other 
countries, especially if it can be demonstrated that it has been effective in preventing a 
terrorist attack or capturing co-conspirators, without unduly threatening the privacy of 
innocent citizens.  
4. Legal Hacking 
Privacy experts have suggested that law enforcement should invest in creating 
laboratories and hiring individuals with the skills necessary to access devices.389 They 
point to the FBI’s ability to find a third-party who provided them with access to the San 
Bernardino terrorist’s device.390 However, this so-called legal hacking is not without 
controversy. If the government is able to attract individuals with the knowledge and skills 
to hack devices, will they be able to pass law enforcement’s stringent background 
investigations, which are a requirement for the hiring process? Most state, local and tribal 
agencies lack the funding necessary to build and staff suitable laboratories.391 These 
agencies also lack the funding to farm out devices to third-party vendors to infiltrate on a 
case-by-case basis.392 In addition, most government wages do not compare with those 
offered in Silicon Valley. More importantly, if these individuals become government 
employees and uncover vulnerabilities in specific device designs, is there a moral or legal 
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obligation to notify the company of the weaknesses?393 To do so would allow the 
company to fix any weaknesses and therefore protect its customers and intellectual 
property.  
But this would come at a cost to law enforcement. Law enforcement would have 
to return to the drawing board to identify a new vulnerability that would provide access 
for any future devices of the same model, as the uncovered weaknesses would no longer 
exist. It seems unlikely that legal hackers would enjoy much success, as the device 
designers claim that they cannot break their own encryption.394 Apple’s General Counsel 
testified that the company would take issue with the FBI successfully hacking their 
devices.395 In addition, attempting to uncover vulnerabilities for the variety of devices on 
the market would be extremely costly and time-consuming, and in some cases, time is not 
a luxury that law enforcement is afforded.396 Moreover, data obtained through hacking 
would be challenged in court when cases progress to the trial phase, as this method is 
untested.397 At question would be data integrity, specifically whether law enforcement 
planted evidence or omitted exculpatory evidence.398 Tying up cases in the judicial 
system would unnecessarily cost taxpayers money and law enforcement time, all of 
which could have been avoided if providers continued to supply law enforcement with 
trusted device content.399 This option seems like a better fit for the NSA, as opposed to 
state, local and federal law enforcement, which have limited resources.  
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5. Compelling Users to Reveal Their Passcodes 
Some technology companies have also suggested that law enforcement should 
compel device holders to reveal their passwords.400 This solution is not feasible as it 
would jeopardize ongoing investigations. An argument can also be made that forcing an 
individual to divulge information that may ultimately be used against that person in a 
court of law violates the Fifth Amendment.401 In the case of the San Bernardino 
terrorists, the device users were deceased, making the point moot.402 However, in 
instances where investigations are not in the covert stage and law enforcement has access 
to the subjects and their devices, some targets have been compelled to disclose passcodes 
or use their fingerprints to unlock devices.403 Judicial rulings have varied depending on 
the state.404 A Florida judge ruled that compelling a subject to reveal his/her passcode is 
not protected by the Fifth Amendment, while judges in Pennsylvania and Colorado 
disagreed.405 Apple iOS 11, which is slated to be released in the fall of 2017, will 
reportedly have a function that allows the user to disable the Touch ID sensor feature by 
engaging the power button five times.406 When Touch ID is enabled, the user’s 
fingerprint is used for authentication purposes to unlock the device.407 Some are referring 
to this new feature as the “cop button” because they anticipate it will thwart law 
enforcement’s ability to quickly and easily access user devices and content.408  
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6. Access via Cloud Storage 
Backing up data to the various cloud systems provides unlimited storage capacity 
and convenience, but the process is not without vulnerabilities. Companies that offer 
cloud storage, such as Microsoft, Dropbox and Google, all allow mechanized processes, 
employees, and some third parties to view data.409 These policies place individual 
privacy and the intellectual property of those entrusting their data storage to the cloud at 
risk.410 Consumers can take precautions, such as employing zero-knowledge 
technology.411 Prior to uploading the information to the cloud, the user encodes the 
message, which in theory would mean that only the user can access the data.412 However, 
this is done with a level of trust that no backdoors have been built into the software.413 
Users have the option of obtaining their own encryption software rather than using what 
is provided by the cloud administrator.414 Some technology companies claim that law 
enforcement should turn its focus to serving cloud storage companies with proper legal 
process to obtain the data it needs for investigations.415 However, not every user backs 
their data up in this method.416 Reasons for this vary, including associated service fees, 
lack of trust in security protocols, or underestimating the value of device backup.417 In 
the case of the San Bernardino terrorists, the saved data was not relevant because it had 
not been backed up for six weeks.418 In addition, if zero-knowledge or other enhanced 
encryption is used, then data stored in the cloud will remain out of law enforcement’s 
reach.  
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7. Key Escrow 
Another possibility that may provide law enforcement with the assistance it 
requires is the use of key escrow.419 In the event future access is warranted, key escrow 
creates an additional symmetric key that would be in the possession of the device creator 
or the government.420 Public keys for the intended recipient and the escrow agent would 
be included with every message sent.421 The symmetric key could be decrypted by the 
escrow key, allowing for the data to be deciphered.422 The argument against this 
approach is that it would encourage hackers to actively infiltrate the escrow entity.423 
However, hackers would have to know that this method was in use and which entities 
acted as escrow agents. Technology experts claim that insiders could exploit the system if 
key escrow were employed.424 Yet Apple maintains encryption keys to access data stored 
in the cloud, which begs the question, why is it safe enough for the cloud but not phones? 
Apple’s General Counsel responded to this query following testimony provided in March 
2016.  
Securing data that exists on servers in apple’s facilities is a very different 
challenge from securing data that exists on an iPhone or an iPad in the 
possession of our customers. These devices are physically lost and stolen. 
In addition, customers use iCloud in different ways from how they use 
their devices, so in designing our products we take those differences into 
account. This is a question that we continually address as we strive to 
make our products both as secure and as usable as possible.425 
8. Internet of Things  
Experts claim that with the advent of the IoT, common household appliances will 
replace commonly used communication methods that can be exploited to eavesdrop on 
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private conversations in a subject’s home.426 However, these technologies have yet to be 
widely adopted, and would necessitate arming law enforcement with the knowledge of 
specific devices used. Even if and when these IoT devices become more commonly used, 
their reliability is in question and this type of electronic surveillance has not been tested 
in court. How would minimization be accomplished in order to protect innocent parties 
and judicially recognized privileges, such as between spouses, clergy/parishioner, 
doctor/patient, and attorney/client?427 In addition, in life or death investigations, there is 
no guarantee that a household appliance would pick up conversations detailing where and 
when an attack is planned, or where a kidnapping victim is being held. 
Many possibilities currently exist, and others could be specifically created to 
allow law enforcement to continue accessing electronic communications regarding 
investigative targets. The challenge lies is determining which, if any, of the possible 
solutions detailed above will meet the needs of law enforcement without compromising 
individual privacy or the intellectual property of communications providers and device 
creators. Is it possible to find common ground on this issue between the interested 
parties? Are communication technologies and encryption capabilities evolving so rapidly 
as to make any proposed solution improbable? 
C. ANALYSIS OF DECRYPTION/ACCESS TECHNIQUES 
The varying techniques available to law enforcement are further analyzed in 
Table 3. Each decryption/access technique was examined to determine viability, risk and 
potential costs that may cause concern for privacy experts, law enforcement and 
legislators. The categories scrutinized were based on objections that the various 
stakeholders have raised throughout the debate on this topic. Scores were assigned by 
entity impact, with higher scores equating to increased risk and/or costs. 
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Table 3.   Policy Options Matrix-Weighted Comparison of the Varying 
Decryption/Access Techniques 
The results of the analysis indicate that some of the techniques do not seem viable 
as the cost or risk level is too high. The IoT is untested and it is unknown if any of the 
devices with the potential to be exploited were designed in a manner to prevent such 
activity. As a result, whether this method could successfully be used to collect useable 
information that would withstand judicial scrutiny is questionable. Key escrow would 
likely still require the assistance of the private sector that would bear the brunt of the 
costs, and be vulnerable to outside hackers and rogue insiders. Law enforcement may 
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hacking would require a significant capital outlay for the government, which would make 
it cost prohibitive for state and local law enforcement. Isolating exploitable 
vulnerabilities for the myriad devices and operating systems on the market would be 
extremely time-consuming and present a moral dilemma as to whether law enforcement 
would be obligated to notify providers of any identified weaknesses. Signing updates 
may afford defense attorneys the opportunity to suggest that evidence was planted or 
exculpatory evidence was omitted. In addition, the private sector would bear the burden 
of costs, and users can opt out of updates that would render this method ineffective. 
However, the analysis also revealed that there were two options that may be feasible, 
split-key encryption and spyware insertion. 
1. Split-Key Encryption Advantages and Disadvantages 
Using the analysis in the table above, split-key encryption presents a promising 
option. As two or more keys are required to decrypt communications, the risk of outside 
hacking is significantly diminished. Device designers would be able to safeguard their 
intellectual property and protect customer privacy from insider threats by sharing 
decryption responsibilities with law enforcement. Although the private sector would bear 
the brunt of the costs, engineering this option in the design phase would save device 
designers money and law enforcement time, with the added benefit of potentially 
reducing vulnerabilities.428 Split-key encryption would also likely withstand legal 
challenges in the event an investigation proceeds to the trial phase, unlike the untested 
options of signing updates, legal hacking and the exploitation of the IoT. These methods 
open the door for defense attorneys to claim that law enforcement planted incriminating 
evidence, omitted exculpatory evidence, or did not adequately protect judicially 
recognized privileges. The collaboration necessary for the split-key option provides a 
system of checks and balances, reducing the chances for either party to introduce or 
modify data and content. The cost to the government would likely be the same as for any 
Title III intercept, unlike the considerable costs of purchasing equipment and hiring 
personnel to establish legal hacking laboratories. Many state, local, and federal agencies 
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lack funding for such an endeavor. Finally, the required collaboration may improve the 
relationship between the public and private sectors. 
Drawbacks to split-key encryption include the requirement for new or amended 
legislation to compel compliance. This could prove difficult as the private sector’s 
willingness to assist law enforcement has diminished significantly since the Snowden 
leaks.429 In addition, technology firms have the resources to employ lobbyists whose 
responsibility it is to ensure that their best interests are considered by lawmakers.430 
Lastly, most device designers and communication providers do not assist law 
enforcement free of charge. Many companies charge by the type of assistance provided, 
such as specified fees for Title III intercepts, or by the time spent replying to other law 
enforcement requests.431 Additionally, there can be considerable lags in response times, 
depending on the type of request.  
2. Spyware Insertion Advantages and Disadvantages 
Conversely, the legislation that German lawmakers recently enacted allowing 
authorities to insert spyware onto a target’s device may also prove to be a viable 
option.432 Although this technique is still in its infancy, it does not seem to be overly 
costly or place the public or corporate intellectual property at undue risk. This technique 
appears to be similar to how French authorities have examined target computers since 
2011. Prior to adopting this option, U.S. lawmakers, as well as law enforcement could 
reach out to their German and French counterparts to determine the effectiveness of these 
methods and make amendments to any proposed legislation based on lessons learned. A 
major concern of privacy and security experts has been that providing law enforcement 
backdoor access would endanger technological ingenuity and discourage the public from 
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employing encryption to protect individual privacy.433 Device designers and 
communication providers are not being directed to modify their products in order for the 
spyware to be inserted; therefore it is arguable as to whether this method constitutes a 
backdoor.  
The value of this option lies in its simplicity and may have the added benefit of 
saving law enforcement the time and expense of continually adapting to new and ever 
more sophisticated encryption techniques. As the spyware gives authorities access to 
message and device content prior to encryption or after decryption, it follows that law 
enforcement will not be hamstrung by future encryption developments.434 The 
deployment of the State Trojan technique has the potential to save lives if information 
regarding future terrorist attacks can be extracted from messages that have been placed 
out of law enforcement’s reach by enhanced encryption and the private sector’s desire to 
use privacy and anonymity as marketing tools for their products.435 Additionally, it does 
not appear that this option requires the cooperation of the private sector.  
After reviewing the various potential options for restoring law enforcement’s 
access to electronic communications, two techniques stand out as being the most feasible: 
split-key encryption and the insertion of State Trojans. These options appear to provide 
the most protection to individual privacy and corporate intellectual property, as well as 
being cost-effective. However, split-key encryption relies on collaboration with the 
private sector, which has openly opposed assisting law enforcement overcome encryption 
issues. Although the installation of spyware would likely be challenged in court 
proceedings, installing State Trojans seems more controlled than the aforementioned 
legal hacking. Analyzing Germany’s successes and/or failures with this option in January 
2018 may prove useful. It may be prudent to scrutinize the State Trojan’s effectiveness 
and any legal ramifications that may have surfaced after this technique has been in use 
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for six months. This analysis may aid U.S. lawmakers in crafting appropriate legislation 
if it is deemed a viable option.  
 67 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Capturing and analyzing communications has long been an effective tool in law 
enforcement’s arsenal. This capability has aided in the furtherance of countless 
investigations and many public safety agencies consider it invaluable. CALEA is the 
primary legislation used to compel communication providers to assist law enforcement 
with intercepting traditional telephone and VoIP communications.436 However, 
continuous innovation has led to the advent of new methods of communication, which are 
not subject to the mandates of CALEA.437 Further, following the Edward Snowden leaks, 
many in the technology field began engineering their products and devices with enhanced 
encryption.438 The rationale for these changes was to safeguard individual privacy, as 
well as corporate intellectual property.439 However, both the emergence of new 
communication platforms that are not legislated by CALEA, and the addition of 
sophisticated encryption that in many cases law enforcement has been unable to bypass, 
have had a detrimental impact on criminal and terrorist investigations.440 
The enhanced encryption that companies, such as Apple and Google have 
engineered into their products is so sophisticated that even when served with proper legal 
process, they themselves cannot bypass it to assist law enforcement.441 Despite the best 
intentions of the device designers, negative consequences arise from enhanced 
encryption. Investigative targets seek out methods of communications that provide 
anonymity, and if law enforcement is unable to access communications, then the criminal 
element benefits from these enhancements.442 The difficulty lies in providing law 
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enforcement with the continued access it has legislatively been granted for decades, 
without sacrificing individual privacy and endangering intellectual property.  
Options exist for amending CALEA to include emerging communication 
platforms, or drafting entirely new legislation that would require providers and device 
designers to maintain the capability to bypass any encryption they create.443 However, 
resistance has been met on many sides. Some legislators oppose requiring the private 
sector to comply with more stringent regulations, and the Departments of State and 
Commerce worry that hostile regimes could bypass encryption and persecute citizens.444 
Technology and privacy experts claim that providing law enforcement with the assistance 
it requires threatens innovation, international corporate sales and the privacy of all device 
users.445 Many of these same experts also assert that the emerging platforms should not 
fall under CALEA, as users tend to communicate more freely and share more intimate 
details of their lives than on standard voice communications.446  
However, the private sector has a role in safeguarding national security, and 
corporations benefit from operating in a stable environment.447 As government entities, 
law enforcement agencies appear to be paying the price for the actions of the NSA and its 
mass collection of data.448 Nevertheless, law enforcement should recognize its requests 
for continued access to communications may present a risk to individuals and 
corporations, depending on the method(s) used.449 The research and analysis for this 
thesis focused on decryption techniques and legislative options that may be used to solve 
this controversial issue.  
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The goal of this thesis was to determine how law enforcement could overcome 
insurmountable encryption to access existing and emerging electronic communications to 
further investigations without compromising individual privacy and intellectual property. 
Research for this thesis uncovered six decryption/access techniques that could be used to 
address the “Going Dark” issue. The policy analysis method was used to analyze these 
techniques in an attempt to determine viability. The San Bernardino terrorist investigation 
was also reviewed to add perspective to the issue currently confronting law enforcement.  
A. LIMITATIONS 
The primary limitation of this thesis is the lack of information regarding spyware 
or State Trojan insertion, recently employed by the German government.450 This method 
appears to be a viable solution for a segment of the “Going Dark” problem U.S. law 
enforcement currently faces, but as it is new and untested, its effectiveness remains 
unknown.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Obtaining information from prosecutors as to why not all wiretap statistics are 
reported to the court could prove useful. Some prosecutors choose to delay reporting to 
protect ongoing investigations, but target specific data is not part of the data captured.451 
It may be that not all prosecutors are aware of the mandate to report this information or 
how the statistics are used, which could be why some of the data remains unreported. 
Perhaps training could help alleviate this problem. Surveying prosecutors to determine 
the reasons for reporting issues would be useful, but it may be unrealistic to expect legal 
professionals to willingly respond to such inquiries that could negatively impact their 
careers. 
                                                 
450 Chase, “Things to Know”; Bleiker, “New Surveillance Law.” 
451 “FAQs: Wiretap Reports,” United States Courts, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/wiretap-reports/faqs-wiretap-reports; Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, WT-2A Federal Form.  
 70 
It could also prove useful to conduct follow-up research on Germany’s successes 
and failures with the deployment of the State Trojan technique.452 Answers to the 
following questions could provide U.S. legislators with the information necessary to craft 
similar legislation that could be adopted domestically, as well as offer an avenue for 
future research: 
• Has data integrity been an issue? 
• How long does the process take? 
• How effective has this method been in providing law enforcement with 
information to further criminal investigations?  
• What percentage of devices was the State Trojan successfully installed and 
useable information retrieved? 
• How long did it take long for law enforcement personnel to become 
subject matter experts? 
• Has this process impacted device performance that was obvious to the 
target? 
• Has this process been challenged in court? If so, did the use of this 
technique withstand judicial scrutiny? 
• Have the legislators opposed to this law gained traction in repealing the 
measure, or have any successes firmly cemented its use by German law 
enforcement?453 
C. CONCLUSION 
The research and analysis for this thesis has culminated in five conclusions. The 
first conclusion is that newly drafted legislation or legislation amending CALEA is 
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necessary to solve the “Going Dark” issue. Regardless of the decryption or access 
technique(s) chosen as the most feasible to address this problem, appropriate legislation 
will be necessary to ensure compliance by device designers and communication 
providers, or to grant law enforcement the authority to act on its own. As such, it is 
imperative that any new or amended legislation be crafted in such a way to withstand 
future technological innovations, so that this issue does not become a recurring problem 
as seems to be the case with CALEA.454  
The second conclusion is that due to the limitations of existing legislation, the 
private sector has acted in a manner that constrains law enforcement’s authority to 
conduct legal searches, even when armed with proper legal process.455 Regardless of 
intention, technology innovators have created “zones of impunity,” which allow criminals 
and terrorists to communicate freely and oftentimes anonymously, beyond law 
enforcement’s reach.456 The evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that law 
enforcement investigations are suffering as a result of the “Going Dark” problem. 
Agencies have lost access to far more information than has been gained from the 
collection of communications from new and emerging technologies. Deliberately 
modifying their products to avoid compliance with court orders makes it appear as 
though the private sector has usurped Congressional and judicial authorities.457 This may 
have been a calculated decision on the part of Apple and Google, gambling that it will be 
quite some time before legislators are able to agree on a solution, as many less 
controversial bills are stalled or voted down in Congress. Meanwhile, these corporations 
may continue reaping marketing benefits, as well as expending fewer resources assisting 
law enforcement. 
The third conclusion is that prosecutors may inadvertently be doing the agencies 
they represent and law enforcement in general a disservice regarding the wiretap statistics 
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reported to the court. Prosecutors in some cases choose to delay reporting these statistics 
to protect ongoing investigations, but this data is eventually reported to the court when 
the investigation concludes.458 The problem lies in the statistics that remain unreported. 
The reported statistics are passed on to Congress who evaluates them for various 
purposes, to include assessing the seriousness of the encryption issue.459 When roughly 
one-third of the statistics are not reported in a timely manner, or at all, this may prove 
detrimental to garnering support to address the encryption problem.460  
The fourth conclusion is that despite protestations by privacy and security experts, 
it is possible to provide law enforcement with the access to communications it requires, 
while minimizing the risk to individual privacy and corporate intellectual property. Apple 
deployed their enhanced encryption following the Edward Snowden leaks.461 However, 
the company admits that to their knowledge, their previous encryption and code had not 
been undermined.462 This level of encryption provided adequate privacy protections, yet 
remained accessible to law enforcement with Apple’s assistance.463  
The final conclusion is that out of the six decryption/access techniques analyzed, 
the two that show the most promise are: split-key encryption and the insertion of spyware 
also known as a State Trojan.464 Employment of either option would require new or 
amended legislation. The stalemate that Congress has been experiencing makes passing 
or amending such controversial legislation a significant challenge.  
When split-key encryption is employed, two or more entities collaborate to 
decrypt the data.465 The advantages of this method are decreased vulnerability to outside 
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hackers or internal bad actors, data integrity protection, secure enough to withstand 
judicial scrutiny during court proceedings, and absorption of costs by the private sector, 
which would benefit state and local law enforcement agencies whose budgets are often 
constrained.466 The disadvantages to the split-key option would be the need for new or 
amended legislation to compel device designers or communication providers to maintain 
the capability to access content, regardless of how sophisticated the encryption becomes. 
This option also requires the assistance of the private sector, whose willingness to assist 
law enforcement has waned since 2014.467 Additionally, the government must pay device 
designers and communication providers for costs incurred for providing assistance, and 
response times vary depending on the provider.468 The private sector also has the 
resources to lobby Congress on its behalf, potentially stalling or derailing proposed 
legislation.469 Legislative effectiveness and private sector cooperation present 
considerable hurdles that must be overcome if this option is employed.  
The second option that has potential is the insertion of spyware onto a target 
device by law enforcement. Germany passed legislation in June 2017 granting police 
agencies the authority to use this technique.470 The insertion of spyware allows law 
enforcement to view communications prior to encryption or after decryption has 
occurred.471 The advantages to this option are the ease and anticipated low costs of 
spyware insertion, faster receipt of required data due to discontinued reliance on device 
designers or communication providers, and not having to compete with future encryption 
techniques, which could result in additional cost and time savings. Additionally, 
individual privacy and corporate intellectual property are protected as the spyware is 
inserted onto a specific device, contingent upon a judicially approved court order. The 
                                                 
466 Schaul, “Encryption Techniques”; Homeland Security Newswire, “Growing Opposition in 
Germany”; District Attorney, New York County, Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on 
Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety: An Update, 16, 30; Hibbard, “Wiretapping the Internet,” 390; 
Peterson and Nakashima, “Obama Administration Explored Ways to Bypass Smartphone Encryption.” 
467 Hennessey and Wittes, “Apple Is Selling You an iPhone.” 
468 CBS News, “Verizon, AT&T Get Most.” 
469 Shaban, “Facebook and Apple Spent More on Lobbying.” 
470 Homeland Security Newswire, “Growing Opposition in Germany.” 
471 German Bundestag, “18 Election Period 12785,” 49. 
 74 
disadvantages of this option lie mostly in the fact that it is untested. Currently, it is 
unknown how this method would withstand judicial scrutiny in court proceedings, how 
difficult it is to extract the data in a manner that meets the threshold for preserving 
evidence, what training will be required or how long it will take to become proficient for 
those tasked with intercepting communications via this method, or if the user/target 
notices a difference in device performance that would alert him/her to law enforcement’s 
actions. An additional disadvantage is the necessity for new legislation granting law 
enforcement the authority to insert spyware, contingent on judicial approval. However, as 
the private sector is not being required to modify their product or asked to absorb related 
costs, any lobbying efforts on their behalf may not be as effective, which could ease 
passage of legislation. The introduction of any new law enforcement methods come with 
risks, but given law enforcement’s current predicament in accessing encrypted 
communications, the advantages to spyware insertion seem to outweigh the 
disadvantages, as shown in Table 4.  
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What Table 4 demonstrates is that both decryption/access options have 
advantages and disadvantages. Access to communications and device content is a 
complex issue. Perhaps the reason it has been so difficult to overcome is that it has 
traditionally been approached as a single issue, when in reality it requires a two-pronged 
approach. When law enforcement has the device in its custody, subsequent to an arrest, 
search warrant or court order, the focus will likely be on retrieving data at rest. Data at 
rest refers to all content stored on the device, not ongoing communications in real 
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time.472 In these instances, split-key encryption seems to be the best option for fulfilling 
law enforcement’s needs while still providing a level of security for individual privacy 
and corporate intellectual property. As this option relies on the private sector’s assistance, 
it would likely preserve the integrity of the data, withstand judicial scrutiny and keep 
governmental costs down. 
Conversely, surreptitious monitoring of data in motion, communications 
occurring in real time, is a valuable tool used by law enforcement engaged in ongoing, 
long-term investigations. In these instances, the device remains in the hands of the 
subject, who is unaware of the electronic surveillance.473 The installation of a State 
Trojan/spyware may be the most efficient method for law enforcement to monitor 
communications without having to rely on the private sector for assistance. Although 
spyware insertion is to date an untested method or at least not widely reported via open 
sources, it seems to have many advantages. The appropriate response to emerging 
communication platforms and enhanced encryption by law enforcement and legislators 
should include innovative techniques, and the insertion of spyware onto a target’s device 
is certainly revolutionary. Therefore, drafting legislation that addresses how law 
enforcement can obtain both data at rest and data in motion, using the techniques 
described above may provide the solutions necessary for these issues.  
                                                 

















Figure 2.  WT-2A Federal Form—Report of Application and/or Order 
Authorizing Interception of Communications474 
                                                 
474 Source: United States Courts, “Wiretap Reports.” 
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